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INTRODUCTION 
ONSIDER three notable recent assertions of the President’s foreign 
affairs powers. First, in 2011, President Obama ordered U.S. armed 
forces to attack Libya without any authorization from Congress.1 Sec-
ond, in a case before the Supreme Court in the spring of 2012, the 
Obama Administration refused to enforce a congressional statute involv-
ing the contents of U.S. passports on the ground that this statute intruded 
on the President’s “exclusive” power to recognize foreign nations.2 
Third, at various points in 2011 and 2012, the Obama Administration 
has claimed that it can ratify an important international agreement on in-
tellectual property without any clear authorization from Congress or the 
Senate.3 
These examples involve three very different areas of foreign relations 
law—war powers, recognition, and treaty-making. Yet they have much 
in common. All raise constitutional questions of the separation of pow-
ers between Congress and the President. All showcase aggressive asser-
tions of presidential power to act either in the absence of congressional 
legislation or in defiance of it. And all are defended by their supporters 
 
1 See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, to Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., Authority to Use Military Force in 
Libya (Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Libya Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/
olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf. 
2 Brief for Respondent at 13, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (No. 10-699).  
3  Fact Sheet, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ACTA: Meeting U.S. Objectives 
(Oct. 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/
september/acta-meeting-us-objectives [hereinafter USTR Fact Sheet]; Letter from Ambassa-
dor Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Representative, to Senator Ron Wyden (Dec. 7, 2011), available at 
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Kirk-12072011.pdf; Letter from Harold 
Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Senator Ron Wyden (Mar. 6, 2012), 
available at http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/84365507-State-Department-
Response-to-Wyden-on-ACTA.pdf.  
C
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not so much based on the Constitution’s text, but rather based on past 
practice. 
One other similarity is that these examples all relate to questions of 
international law. The Libya intervention raised international legal ques-
tions regarding the use of force; the power at issue in the passport case is 
the power to accord recognition as a matter of international law to for-
eign nations; and the intellectual property agreement would create inter-
national legal obligations for the United States. But those focused on the 
separation of powers would be forgiven for letting this similarity pass 
unnoticed. In the briefs, legal opinions, and academic commentary relat-
ing to these three examples of expansive presidential power, internation-
al law is mentioned at most only in passing.4 The relevant law—the in-
terpretation of the Constitution—is taken to be a purely domestic matter. 
These examples thus reveal the absence of international law from the 
interpretive principles used today to determine the constitutional separa-
tion of powers.5 While international law can be an input for other princi-
ples of interpretation—for example, textualists might look to interna-
tional law in determining the meaning of the phrase “declare war” in Ar-
Article I, Section 8—constitutional actors and commentators today do 
not treat international law as a direct principle of constitutional interpre-
tation in the separation of powers context. This absence should not be 
surprising if constitutional interpretation is a purely domestic matter, and 
there are many who think it should be. Justices Scalia and Thomas, for 
example, treat international law as “irrelevant to the meaning of our 
Constitution,” and their belief is shared by numerous members of Con-
gress and distinguished legal scholars.6 What is surprising, however, is 
 
4 See infra Part IV.  
5 A few notes on terminology. First, my focus on this Article is on the separation of pow-
ers between the President and Congress in the foreign affairs context. Nonetheless, for short-
hand I often use the broader term “separation of powers” rather than the more precise “sepa-
ration of foreign affairs powers.” Second, I use the term “international law” in its usual sense 
of encompassing both customary international law and treaties. From my examination, of the 
two forms of international law, however, customary international law has mattered more as a 
principle of constitutional interpretation. Third, I use the term “constitutional actors” 
throughout to refer to members of the three branches of the federal government who play a 
role in deciding what acts are constitutional. 
6 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2053 n.12 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also, 
e.g., H.R. 973, 112th Cong. (2011) (bill introduced in the House with about fifty co-sponsors 
that would limit federal courts’ use of foreign law); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005) (pro-
posed resolution introduced in the Senate expressing the sense that the use of foreign law in 
constitutional interpretation is appropriate only if it informs the “original meaning” of the 
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that even those who consider international law to be a guiding principle 
in other areas of constitutional interpretation do not seem to see it as 
similarly important to the separation of powers. While they defend in-
ternational law as an interpretive principle for most aspects of constitu-
tional law—the territorial reach of the Constitution, the scope of the fed-
eral government’s powers, principles of federalism, and individual 
rights—they do not describe it as similarly relevant to the separation of 
powers.7 In other words, regardless of the role that international law 
plays in other areas of constitutional interpretation, its bearing on the 
separation of powers is limited. 
It was not always this way. As this Article will show, international 
law historically played a direct and important role in shaping the consti-
tutional separation of powers between Congress and the President. This 
role has been largely overlooked by contemporary scholarship because 
this scholarship tends to focus on constitutional interpretation by the 
courts, particularly the Supreme Court. The separation of foreign affairs 
powers between Congress and the President, however, has mostly been 
determined outside the courts, by the actions and inactions of the politi-
cal branches. As it turns out, historically both political branches have re-
lied on international law as an interpretive principle for determining the 
boundaries of their constitutional powers. 
Importantly, the role that international law has played in the separa-
tion of powers has not been a neutral one. Instead, constitutional actors 
have typically relied on international law in ways that have strengthened 
the powers of the President vis-à-vis Congress. Along with using inter-
national law as an input for other interpretive principles, constitutional 
actors have relied on international law in two main ways. First, they 
have sometimes used international law as a principle that directly guides 
constitutional interpretation. Nineteenth-century proponents of the Pres-
ident’s sole power to recognize foreign nations, for example, asserted 
that international law only recognized the pronouncements of executive 
 
Constitution); see also academic sources cited infra note 19. These objections are typically 
applied to both comparative and international law, are often combined under the label of 
“foreign law,” and generally except the use of these sources as inputs for originalism.  
7 See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 12–
27, 33–87 (2006); see also sources cited infra note 50. As discussed infra note 47, there is a 
limited exception for the separation of powers regarding the conduct of hostilities (as op-
posed to the entry into hostilities). Here, some constitutional actors and scholars have recog-
nized a role for international law as a principle of constitutional interpretation, albeit one that 
is often closely tied to concerns about individual rights.  
GALBRAITH_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2013 2:44 PM 
2013] International Law and Separation of Powers 991 
actors, and therefore that the Constitution necessarily entrusted the pow-
er of recognition to the President. While international law could in theo-
ry be used to favor the powers of either Congress or the President, in 
practice most uses of international law favored the President because of 
the close connection perceived between executive action and interna-
tional law. Second, constitutional actors have relied on international law 
as an alternative source of legitimacy for presidential actions where the 
constitutional basis for these actions was otherwise lacking or unclear. 
While these precedents were initially understood and explained primari-
ly in terms of international law, they ultimately became precedents for 
expansive presidential powers as a matter of constitutional law. 
The effects of international law’s role in the separation of powers re-
main with us today. They are shielded from present recognition but are 
kept relevant by the most important tool in the interpretation of the sepa-
ration of foreign affairs powers today: reliance on past practice. Past 
practice offers a historical “gloss” on the separation of powers that is 
understood to help resolve questions about it. This gloss has an opaque 
quality: It makes past practices relevant without requiring a searching 
inquiry into why these practices themselves took place. The historical 
gloss thus shields the role that international law played in establishing 
key precedents while at the same time causing these precedents to matter 
greatly to our present-day constitutional interpretation. Indeed, as this 
Article will show, the precedents in war powers, recognition, and treaty-
making that the Obama Administration relied on to support its recent 
aggressive stances in these areas all owe a debt to international law’s 
past role in constitutional interpretation. 
The role that international law has played in strengthening executive 
power in turn holds implications both for how we understand the separa-
tion of powers today and for the relationship between presidential power 
and international law. International law helped grow presidential power, 
and members of Congress accepted this growth, in part because interna-
tional law was also understood to impose certain constraints on presi-
dential action. As this connection has eroded, however, it has created a 
situation where neither the original congressional checks envisioned at 
the Framing nor the international legal checks recognized in the hun-
dred-and-fifty years that followed are understood to serve as strong con-
straints on presidential foreign affairs powers. This problematic situation 
has been recently termed the “Executive Unbound” by Professors Eric 
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Posner and Adrian Vermeule.8 This Article thus ends with some tenta-
tive thoughts on how to recapture the interplay between international 
law and the separation of powers in a way that restores some constraints 
on presidential power. 
The rest of this Article develops and supports the themes outlined 
above. Part I identifies three ways in which international law can influ-
ence constitutional interpretation: first, as an input for other principles of 
constitutional interpretation; second, as a direct principle of constitu-
tional interpretation; and third, as an alternative source of legitimacy for 
actions that ultimately become constitutional precedents. Part II high-
lights what I call the “separation-of-powers anomaly”: the fact that while 
many constitutional actors and commentators today accept international 
law as a direct principle of constitutional interpretation in certain areas 
of constitutional law, they do not treat it as similarly relevant to the sep-
aration of powers. Part III shows how international law has in fact been 
used in the past by constitutional actors—particularly actors situated in 
the political branches—in all three of the ways described in Part I to 
help enhance the President’s foreign affairs powers. More specifically, I 
focus on the roles played by international law in the separation of pow-
ers in three key areas: recognition, war powers regarding entry into hos-
tilities, and treaty-making. Part IV uses the three current examples men-
tioned at the beginning of this Article to show how these enhanced 
presidential powers continue today under the guise of reliance on past 
practice, even though their international legal roots are now obscured 
and any limits set by international law are thus lost. Finally, Part V con-
siders the lessons this forgotten history holds for constitutional interpre-
tation today, including the extent to which international law should con-
strain the President. 
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: 
CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL ACCOUNTS 
In recent years, the role of international law in constitutional interpre-
tation has proved astonishingly contentious. Not only has it been the 
subject of heated debate within Supreme Court decisions and among le-
gal scholars, but it has become a cause célèbre in the public sphere more 
generally. Backlash against the Supreme Court’s use of international law 
 
8 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the 
Madisonian Republic (2010). 
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in constitutional decision-making has even led to the introduction of 
congressional legislation to curtail the use of foreign law by federal 
courts. Justifying the need for such legislation, the chief sponsor of one 
recent bill explained that by “interject[ing] international law into their 
rulings,” Supreme Court justices have shown “transparent disregard for 
the Constitution.”9 
A closer look at the controversy shows that it focuses not on all uses 
of international law in constitutional interpretation, but rather largely on 
one particular role that international law can play in constitutional inter-
pretation. This is the role that international law can play as a direct prin-
ciple of constitutional interpretation—as something that guides the pro-
cess by which constitutional actors approach the Constitution. But this is 
not the only role that international law can play in constitutional inter-
pretation. It has at least two other possible roles as well. One is to serve 
as a source of information—an input—that assists constitutional actors 
applying other principles of constitutional interpretation. The other, less 
conventional role that international law can play is to help justify consti-
tutionally dubious actions by serving as an extra-constitutional source of 
legitimacy. 
This Part describes all three roles that international law can play in 
constitutional interpretation. I begin with international law’s role as an 
input for other theories of constitutional interpretation, then turn to its 
more contentious role as a direct principle of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Lastly, I discuss how international law might influence constitu-
tional interpretation by serving as an extra-constitutional source of legit-
imacy. 
A. International Law as an Input for Other Principles of Constitutional 
Interpretation 
The least controversial role that international law plays in constitu-
tional interpretation is to serve as an input for other principles of consti-
tutional interpretation. If one believes, for example, that the Constitution 
should be interpreted according to its text’s ordinary meaning at the time 
of the Framing, then the law of nations at the time of the Framing will 
obviously be relevant for interpreting the clauses in the Constitution that 
 
9 Sandy Adams, Op-Ed., Ban Foreign Law from Courts; We Make Our Own Laws, Wash. 
Times, Mar. 10, 2011, at B3; see also H.R. 973, 112th Cong. (2011) (bill introduced by Rep. 
Adams and numerous co-sponsors to limit federal courts’ use of foreign law). 
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implicitly or explicitly reference international legal standards. Scholars 
applying this approach have accordingly looked to the law of nations at 
the time of the Framing in understanding the meaning of terms like “de-
clare war” that appear in the Constitution’s text.10 
Here international law serves as an input for a form of textualism, but 
it can also be an input for other interpretive approaches. Those who ap-
ply a textualism that considers the evolving meaning of words, for ex-
ample, could look to the evolving meaning of “treaty” in international 
law to interpret the clauses of the Constitution that refer to treaties.11 
Similarly, those who emphasize the original intentions of the Framers 
could find international law at the time of the Framing relevant to under-
standing these intentions.12 As yet another example, structural constitu-
tionalists guided by the tripartite scheme set forth by Justice Jackson in 
Youngstown could view international law, or at least certain forms of in-
ternational law, as inputs comparable to congressional legislation—for 
instance, as having the power structurally to put the President at his 
maximum authority (category 1) or alternatively at his “lowest ebb” 
(category 3).13 
 
10 See e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations as Constitu-
tional Law, 98 Va. L. Rev. 729, 735 (2012) (exploring “the original public meaning of sev-
eral specific constitutional powers—such as the power to recognize foreign nations, the war 
power, and the powers to authorize reprisals and captures—which can only be understood 
against background assumptions provided by the law of nations” (emphasis omitted)); Mi-
chael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1543, 1545 (2002) (look-
ing to international law around the time of the framing to understand the textual meaning of 
the “declare war” clause); see also Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and Constitu-
tional Interpretation: The Commander-in-Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 61, 
82–95 (2007) (looking to international law to interpret the scope of the commander-in-chief 
power at the time of the Framing).  
11 E.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 302 cmt. c & reporters’ note 2 
(1987) (asserting that the “references in the Constitution presumably incorporate the concept 
of treaty and of other agreements in international law” and then looking to twentieth-century 
international law to define the reach of this concept). 
12 This approach seems to be underlying Justice Scalia’s use of international law in his re-
cent dissent in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2513 (2012) (relying on interna-
tional law at the time of the Framing in interpreting the boundaries of state and federal sov-
ereignty). 
13 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring); cf. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524–27 (2008) (holding that the Presi-
dent acts in Youngstown category 3 when he tries to transform non-self-executing treaty ob-
ligations into domestic law obligations). There is room for debate as to which international 
law obligations—namely, self-executing treaties, non-self-executing treaties, and customary 
international law—should be treated as comparable to congressional statutes for this pur-
pose. 
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In all these instances, international law does not operate as a principle 
of constitutional interpretation. Rather, it serves as an input for other in-
terpretive principles, in the same way that dictionary definitions might 
be inputs for textualists, or that historical influences on the Framers 
might be inputs for originalists. This reality makes the role played by in-
ternational law relatively uncontroversial, but also makes the role de-
pendent in two ways on the interpretive principle that controls its use. 
First, international law’s role is dependent on the extent to which its us-
ers rely on the interpretive principle in the first place. For example, con-
stitutional actors will rely on international law as an input to the Fram-
ers’ intent only to the extent to which they find the Framers’ intent to be 
a guiding principle of constitutional interpretation. Second, where inter-
national law is an input for another interpretative principle, it is bound 
by whatever constraints are imposed by that interpretive principle. A 
textualist seeking to recover the original public meaning of the Constitu-
tion, for example, might care only about international law at the time of 
the Framing, not about its dramatic evolution over the subsequent two 
centuries. 
B. International Law as a Principle of Constitutional Interpretation 
A more controversial role that international law can play in constitu-
tional interpretation is to directly influence the process of constitutional 
interpretation. International law will never be the sole principle used for 
interpreting the Constitution, but it can serve as an influential supple-
ment to other interpretative approaches. Constitutional actors and com-
mentators who look to international law as a principle of interpretation 
typically do so by presuming that the Constitution should be interpreted 
to maximize conformity with international law. The strength of this pre-
sumption can vary from the lightest of touches to a substantial weight. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons14 illustrates how 
international law can serve as a principle of constitutional interpretation. 
In holding that the death penalty is an unconstitutional punishment for 
crimes committed by minors, the Supreme Court applied a faint—very 
faint—presumption in favor of reading the Constitution to be in accord-
ance with international legal norms, which bar the use of the death pen-
alty against minors.15 These international legal norms did not apply di-
 
14 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
15 Id. at 575–78. 
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rectly to the United States (which had never consented to the treaty pro-
visions setting forth these norms), but the Court nonetheless viewed 
them as “instructive” and providing “respected and significant confirma-
tion” for its conclusion.16 
Roper and similar cases triggered a backlash against the use of inter-
national law as a principle of constitutional interpretation. Writing in 
dissent, Justice Scalia urged that “the basic premise of the Court’s argu-
ment—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the 
world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”17 While Justice Scalia based 
his objections on a sense of American exceptionalism, others have also 
emphasized that reliance on international law as a principle of constitu-
tional interpretation is undemocratic, as it draws on the views of those 
outside the United States.18 Still others view its use as simply unneces-
sary and unhelpful given the other array of tools of constitutional inter-
pretation. In alarmist tones, Professor Roger Alford has suggested that 
reliance on international law “fundamentally destabilizes the equilibrium 
of constitutional decisionmaking” by adding a “new source” to the tradi-
tional interpretive tools of “text, structure, history, and national experi-
ence.”19 
Roper and the other Supreme Court cases at the center of the recent 
controversy deal mostly with the interpretation of individual rights pro-
visions in the Constitution.20 But scholars sympathetic to the use of in-
 
16 Id. at 575, 578. 
17 Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
18 Chief Justice Roberts made this point at his confirmation hearing. See Transcript: Day 
Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings, Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 2005, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091300876.ht
ml (noting a “concern” based on “democratic theory” with regard to citing foreign law in 
constitutional interpretation); see also, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, An American 
Amendment, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 475, 476 (2009) (“[T]he notion that [developments 
in constitutional law] may be brought about by changes in foreign law violates basic premis-
es of democratic self-governance.”). 
19 Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 57, 57–58 (2004). For an example of other scholarship objecting to the Supreme 
Court’s use of international law, see, e.g., Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms 
from a ‘Wider Civilization’: Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and Inter-
national Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 1283 (2004); cf. 
Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law, 2007 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 637, 639 n.9 (giving numerous citations to scholarship condemning the use of 
foreign law); Rosenkranz, supra note 18.  
20 Other cases include Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (life sentences 
without the possibility of parole for juveniles who committed crimes other than murder); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–77 (2003) (substantive due process in context of the 
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ternational law as a principle of constitutional interpretation have 
demonstrated that in the past the Supreme Court has taken a similar ap-
proach in other areas of constitutional law. Professor Sarah Cleveland 
shows that the Supreme Court has used international law as a “back-
ground principle”21 of constitutional interpretation not only in individual 
rights cases, but also in past cases dealing with the territorial reach of 
constitutional rights, the extent of the federal government’s powers, and 
federalism.22 Cleveland’s far-reaching survey brings what is probably 
the widest scholarly lens applied to the issue of international law’s role 
in constitutional interpretation. Yet, as I discuss in Part II.B, even Cleve-
land finds little role for international law as a background principle of 
constitutional interpretation in the context of separation-of-powers dis-
putes. 
Before turning to the third role that international law can play in con-
stitutional interpretation, it is worth noting that it is not always easy to 
distinguish between the first two roles. For one thing, constitutional ac-
tors do not always clearly explain how or why they are using interna-
tional law in constitutional interpretation. For another, the roles can 
blend together conceptually and practically. Conceptually, for example, 
the roles would blend together for a believer in original intent who con-
cludes that the Framers intended the Constitution’s interpreters to use 
evolving international law as an interpretive principle. Practically, for 
example, one could treat Roper as using international law as a direct 
principle of constitutional interpretation (as I do) or could instead claim 
that the Court was instead applying some unspoken morality-based or 
functionalist principle of interpretation to which international law was 
effectively serving as an input. Yet the distinction is nonetheless helpful, 
for two reasons. First, it captures a genuine difference in how constitu-
tional actors can make use of international law, even if this difference is 
not discernible in every instance. Second, it helps explain why, in the 
debate over the use of international law in constitutional interpretation, 
some uses of international law are relatively uncontroversial while oth-
ers are fiercely contested. 
 
right to privacy); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316–17 (2002) (death penalty); and 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1988) (plurality opinion) (death penalty).  
21 Cleveland, supra note 7, at 33.  
22 Id. at 33–62.  
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C. International Law as a Source of Extra-Constitutional Legitimacy 
The two roles described above are conventional ones, whatever one 
thinks of their merits. There is a question of constitutional interpretation 
and an answer is needed; through these roles, international law can help 
constitutional actors reach the answer. But constitutional law does not 
always develop through tidy processes. Sometimes constitutional actors 
act in response to perceived problems without even considering or justi-
fying the constitutionality of their actions. At other times, they can 
choose deliberately to act in ways that they believe violate the Constitu-
tion—think Thomas Jefferson and the Louisiana Purchase—or in ways 
that they can justify only through dubious constitutional interpretation. 
Such precedents in turn can influence the shape of constitutional law go-
ing forward. 
When do constitutional actors violate the Constitution or aggressively 
push its boundaries? In a recent essay, Professor Richard Pildes suggests 
that the answer may lie in a “kind of consequentialist framework” in 
which the actors “take law into account as an exceptionally important 
factor, but still only as a factor.”23 Constitutional actors are reluctant to 
violate the Constitution, whether out of their own fidelity to it or be-
cause of the political importance attached to compliance with it. Yet 
they may do so if the perceived benefits are high enough and they be-
lieve their actions will be deemed legitimate in the eyes of the public. 
Pildes gives the example of President Obama’s decision to continue us-
ing military force in Libya despite the absence of supportive legislation 
from Congress and suggests that while this decision may have been un-
constitutional, it was sufficiently wise policy that the U.S. political 
community let it pass largely unchallenged.24 
Pildes treats policy considerations as the main source of extra-
constitutional legitimacy. But international law itself could also be a 
source of such legitimacy. Decision-makers could justify actions that vi-
 
23 Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, 1419 (2012) (book 
review) (specifically discussing the President). For a few other recent perspectives on the 
relationship between law and power, see generally Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8; Curtis 
A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. 
L. Rev. 411 (2012) (a piece whose title influenced my own choice of title); Frederick Schau-
er, Is Legality Political?, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 481 (2011); see also Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1257 (2004) (arguing that 
the Constitution contains an embedded principle of necessity that authorizes violations of 
specific constitutional provisions under appropriate circumstances). 
24 Pildes, supra note 23, at 1421. 
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olate or aggressively push the boundaries of the Constitution partly on 
the grounds that these actions are appropriate under international law. 
The Libya conflict itself provides a possible example of this. In using 
force in Libya, President Obama had the sanction of international law—
the Security Council of the United Nations had authorized the interven-
tion—and indeed it is unlikely that he would have ordered the use of 
force without this authorization.25 This international authorization in turn 
may have played a role in reducing domestic resistance to President 
Obama’s decision to keep using force despite the absence of congres-
sional authorization.26 Accordingly, even if this international authoriza-
tion did not affect the constitutional question as a matter of doctrine, it 
may nonetheless have affected the constitutional resolution as a matter 
of politics. 
One need not approve of international law serving as an extra-
constitutional source of legitimacy in order to accept that, as a descrip-
tive matter, it may in fact do so. Two further factors help explain why it 
may have been especially influential at various times in the past. The 
first is that respect for international law within the U.S. political com-
munity has not been constant over time. While in recent times politicians 
have scored points by describing international law as a dangerous threat 
to American values, at other times in our history—such as the time of 
the Framing or right around the end of World War II—international law 
was treated, in the political discourse, with intense and at times over-
 
25 See, e.g., U.N. Security Council Authorizes No-Fly Zone in Libya, FoxNews.com (Mar. 
17, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/03/17/seeks-resolution-authorizing-wide-
range-strikes-libya/ (reporting that “[t]he Obama Administration has said it would not act 
without Security Council authorization”).  
26 Supporters of the Libya intervention made a point of mentioning the Security Council 
Resolution very often. E.g., Letter from President Barack Obama to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives (Mar. 21, 2011), available at http://media.washtimes.com/media/
misc/2011/03/22/2011libyamilitaryrel.pdf (mentioning the Security Council and its resolu-
tion eight times in a one-and-a-half page letter); Testimony of Harold Hongju Koh before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 28, 2011, available at http://www.state.gov/
s/l/releases/remarks/167250.htm (mentioning the Security Council resolution seven times in 
his prepared remarks on the domestic law questions); see also Dustin Tingley & Michael 
Tomz, How Does the U.N. Security Council Influence Public Opinion 1–2 (Nov. 2012) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://politics.virginia.edu/sites/politics.virginia.edu/files/
Tomz-LLB.pdf (conducting experiments through public opinion surveys and finding that 
U.N. Security Council Resolutions substantially increase U.S. public opinion in support of 
military actions because citizens feel a sense of commitment to follow through on these reso-
lutions).  
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whelming respect.27 The greater the public respect for international law, 
the more international law justifications might be accepted as sources of 
extra-constitutional legitimacy. 
The second reason international law’s influence may have been great-
er in the past has to do with a particular constitutional argument. The 
Take Care Clause in Article II provides that the President is to “take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”28 but its text does not specify 
whether these “Laws” include international law. Recently, the Supreme 
Court has suggested that this reference to “Laws” excludes many trea-
ties, and similar reasoning might justify a conclusion that “Laws” also 
excludes customary international law.29 In the past, however, up to at 
least as recently as the 1980s, the Take Care Clause was commonly un-
derstood to apply to international law.30 The Take Care Clause thus 
served as a bridge between the Constitution and international law, at 
least where actions by the President were concerned. Where the Presi-
 
27 See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 
799, 883–85 (1995) (describing the powerful internationalist climate in the United States 
around the end of World War II); David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Na-
tion: The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International 
Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 932, 937–39 (2010) (describing respect of the Framers for 
international law). 
28 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 
29 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (effectively concluding that the Take Care 
Clause does not apply to non-self-executing treaties); see also Edward T. Swaine, Taking 
Care of Treaties, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 331, 335 (2008) (noting that the Take Care Clause has 
“fallen out of favor”). The reasoning in Medellin is brief, unsupported, and seemingly igno-
rant of the history of the Take Care Clause’s interpretation—and therefore may well not 
prove to be the Court’s final word on this issue. Such as it is, however, the Court’s discus-
sion in Medellin implies that “Laws,” for purposes of the Take Care Clause, must create do-
mestic legal obligations, not merely international legal obligations. Applying this approach, 
customary international law would constitute “Laws” only to the extent that it amounts to 
domestic law—an issue which has been hotly disputed since Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. 
Goldsmith published their famous article, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815 (1997).  
30 E.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111 cmt. c (1987); Presidential 
Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 
185, 186 (1980). This understanding was articulated as far back as the Washington Admin-
istration. Pacificus Number I (June 29, 1793), in Alexander Hamilton & James Madison, The 
Pacificus-Helvidius Debate of 1793–1794, at 16 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007) [hereinafter 
Pacificus-Helvidius Debate] (stating that “Our Treaties and the laws of Nations form a part 
of the law of the land” with regard to the Take Care Clause); Helvidius Number II (Aug. 31, 
1793), in id. at 72 (considering it a “truth” that the “executive is charged with the execution 
of all laws, the laws of nations as well as the municipal law which recognizes and adopts 
those laws”) (emphasis omitted); see also Restoration of a Danish Slave, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 
566, 570–71 (1852). 
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dent acted to execute international law, he could justify his actions as a 
matter of constitutional law on the ground that he was taking care of in-
ternational law even where he was acting without any other plausible 
bases of constitutional power. 
II. THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS ANOMALY 
One of the striking developments of constitutional law since the 
Framing has been the rise of presidential power. This is especially true 
where foreign affairs powers are concerned. If the Constitution poses an 
“invitation” for the President and Congress to “struggle for the privilege 
of directing American foreign policy,” as Edwin Corwin famously ob-
served,31 then the President is the accepted winner. While struggles con-
tinue over the allocation of foreign affairs powers between the two polit-
ical branches, the “lion’s share” of power lies clearly with the 
President.32 
Doctrinally, constitutional actors both within and outside the courts 
now justify the President’s enormous foreign affairs powers through a 
variety of interpretive principles, most prominently the embrace of past 
practice as a “gloss” on lawful presidential power. But interestingly, to-
day these principles do not include international law. International law is 
certainly understood to inform the constitutional separation of powers 
via the first of the three roles described in the prior Part, typically as an 
input for textualism and originalism.33 But even constitutional actors and 
commentators who are sympathetic to the use of international law as a 
direct principle of interpretation in other areas of constitutional law do 
not seem to see it as playing that role for the separation of foreign affairs 
powers. This is a curious anomaly, especially since foreign relations law 
 
31 See Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1948, at 208 (1948). 
For a flavor of the massive literature, see generally Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the 
U.S. Constitution 31–62 (1996); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8; Arthur M. Schlesinger, 
Jr., The Imperial Presidency (1973); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive 
Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545 (2004); Bradley & Morri-
son, supra note 23; Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1 (1993); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over 
Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231 (2001).  
32 Corwin, supra note 31, at 208. 
33 See supra note 10; see also, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal 
Common Law of Nations, 109 Colum. L. Rev.1, 5–6 (2009) (arguing that a distinction in the 
law of nations at the time of the Framing between perfect and imperfect rights informs how 
the judicial branch should understand the separation of powers between it and the political 
branches on matters that relate to customary international law). 
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is the area of constitutional law with the most direct connections to in-
ternational law. 
This Part first outlines the conventional justifications for the Presi-
dent’s expansive foreign affairs powers, with a particular focus on the 
role of past practice. It then discusses how notably absent international 
law is from these justifications and suggests that this absence may be 
due to the fact that scholarship examining the role of international law in 
constitutional interpretation has focused almost exclusively on the Su-
preme Court and overlooked constitutional decision-making by the two 
political branches. 
A. Executive Power and Its Doctrinal Defenses 
The checks and balances developed by the Framers have not held up 
well against the “maxim attributed to Napoleon that ‘[t]he tools belong 
to the man who can use them.’”34 The text of the Constitution grants the 
President only a few clear foreign affairs powers: the role of the com-
mander in chief, the authority to receive ambassadors, and the powers, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties and 
appoint ambassadors.35 But Presidents began taking expansive views of 
their foreign affairs powers as early as the Washington Administration 
and aggressively resisted congressional encroachment on their perceived 
prerogatives. Today, the additional foreign affairs powers recognized as 
belonging to the President, either solely or concurrently with Congress, 
include the following: to formulate foreign policy for the United States; 
to be the “sole organ” of communication with other nations on behalf of 
the United States; to represent the United States at international organi-
zations; to recognize foreign nations; to waive obligations owed to the 
United States by other nations; to enter into executive agreements with 
other nations that are binding as a matter of international law and in at 
least some instances can preempt state law; to interpret treaties in the 
first instance; to withdraw the United States from treaties; and to author-
ize the use of force abroad by U.S. troops in pursuit of U.S. interests, at 
least up to a certain threshold of engagement. The divergence between 
the President’s real and paper powers is so great that Louis Henkin ob-
 
34 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
35 U.S. Const. art. II.  
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served that “[w]hat the Constitution says and does not say, then, can not 
have determined what the President can and can not do.”36 
What has determined what the President can and cannot do? There are 
vast literatures in history and political science on this subject,37 but those 
interested in law tend to focus on two sets of legal principles which have 
explicitly or implicitly authorized the expansion of presidential power. 
First, there are justiciability rules such as the political question doctrine 
which courts have developed to avoid making difficult decisions about 
the constitutional scope of presidential power. The effect of these rules 
is to shift decision-making about the limits of presidential power from 
the courts to executive branch lawyers, who have stronger institutional 
reasons for siding with the President.38 Second, and more importantly for 
the purposes of this Article, there are interpretive principles governing 
constitutional interpretation. Not all of these principles tend to favor ex-
pansive executive power, and none do so all the time. Constitutional 
scholars who emphasize the original intent of the Framers, for example, 
tend to disapprove of today’s expansive presidential power, as do schol-
ars who emphasize the structural importance of robust checks and bal-
ances.39 Scholars who emphasize a textual approach can disagree among 
each other dramatically over the degree to which the Constitution’s text 
 
36 Henkin, supra note 31, at 31. 
37 Political science approaches emphasize institutional features that have given the Presi-
dent a practical edge over Congress, such as his advantages as a unitary rather than collective 
actor, and the influence of the party system on the relationship between the political branch-
es. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 23, at 453; Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. 
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2314–15 (2006). Histori-
cal approaches tend to focus on the times and circumstances of particular Presidents. E.g., G. 
Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 
Va. L. Rev. 1 (1999). 
38 See Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Admin-
istration 35 (2007) (“Legal advice to the President from the Department of Justice is neither 
like advice from a private attorney nor like a politically neutral ruling from a court. It is 
something inevitably, and uncomfortably, in between.”); Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis 
in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1448, 1502 (2010) (noting that although 
the Office of Legal Counsel seeks to provide its best view of the law, this role “need not car-
ry the pretense of ‘true’ neutrality”).  
39 E.g., Arthur Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent 
of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 Seton Hall L. Rev. 527, 623–36 (1974) (advo-
cating an original understanding of the Treaty Clause that would give more power to the 
Senate); Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 
54 UCLA L. Rev. 309, 314–15 (2006) (drawing on structural arguments, among others, in 
urging limits on the President’s foreign affairs powers). 
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supports expansive presidential powers.40 Yet expansive presidential 
power has one particular ally among the principles of interpretation—an 
ally so important that it arguably dwarfs the other principles in im-
portance in the separation of powers context. This is reliance on past 
practice, which “is a mainstay of decisionmaking and debates concern-
ing the scope of presidential power.”41 
Reliance on past practice has widespread acceptance as an interpre-
tive principle among constitutional actors. As early as 1796, President 
Washington defended his view of the limited role held by the House of 
Representatives in treaty-making in part on the ground that this reflected 
the practice to date.42 Since then, constitutional actors have considered 
the presence (or absence) of past practice in resolving virtually all sepa-
ration-of-powers disputes. In theory, of course, past practice can cut in 
favor of either the President or Congress. In actuality, however, past 
practice has furthered gradual accretions of presidential power because 
the President, as a unitary actor unhindered by the collective action chal-
lenges that constrain Congress, has both the incentives and the abilities 
to push the boundaries repeatedly.43 
As Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison argue, however, 
the concept of past practice needs to be unpacked. Constitutional actors 
and scholars will sometimes further define past practice in terms of two 
factors: first, the amount of past practice on point, and, second, the ex-
tent to which Congress has acquiesced in this past practice.44 But this 
 
40 Consider, for example, the debate over whether and to what extent the Vesting Clause of 
Article II is a source of unenumerated presidential powers. Compare Prakash & Ramsey, 
supra note 31, at 252–55, with Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 31, at 546–52. 
41 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and 
Legal Constraint, 113 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013). Another important ally is func-
tionalist reasoning. See, e.g., Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs 
Constitution, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87, 89–93 (2009). For example, in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936), Justice Sutherland emphasized that the Pres-
ident needed broad foreign affairs powers “if, in the maintenance of our international rela-
tions, embarrassment—perhaps serious embarrassment—is to be avoided and success for our 
aims achieved.” 
42 George Washington, Message to the House of Representatives, Declining to Submit 
Diplomatic Instructions and Correspondence (Mar. 30, 1796), available at http://millercen
ter.org/president/speeches/detail/3461 (“In this construction of the Constitution every House 
of Representatives has heretofore acquiesced; and until the present time, not a doubt or sus-
picion has appeared to my knowledge that this construction was not the true one.”).  
43 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 23, at 412–15. 
44 In his concurrence in Youngstown, Justice Frankfurter offers the most famous articula-
tion of these factors: 
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breakdown only begs further questions in terms of what counts as past 
practice on point or as congressional acquiescence. Professors Bradley 
and Morrison focus on acquiescence and show that how acquiescence is 
defined can dramatically affect the extent to which it is satisfied.45 Ac-
quiescence could be understood to mean the absence of any congres-
sional legislation regarding a presidential practice, or it could mean the 
lack of objection from any members of Congress regarding this practice, 
or it could mean congressional legislation explicitly or implicitly ap-
proving a presidential practice. The meaning chosen will significantly 
affect the extent of acquiescence because some of these forms of acqui-
escence (for example, the absence of congressional legislation) are easi-
er to come by than others (for example, the presence of affirming legis-
lation). While Professors Bradley and Morrison focus on acquiescence, 
this Article will consider in Part IV how broad or narrow treatments of 
past practice can similarly affect what is understood to be constitutional. 
B. The Absence of International Law 
International law does not currently feature among the interpretive 
principles used to resolve separation of powers questions. While interna-
tional law certainly plays a role in current separation-of-powers disputes, 
it does so almost exclusively as an input for other means of constitution-
al interpretation—most notably originalism and textualism. While inter-
national law has been found to be a direct principle of interpretation in 
 
It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to 
the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon 
them. . . . [A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents 
who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, mak[es] as it were such exercise of 
power part of the structure of our government. 
343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (linking this argument to the Vesting Clause 
in Article II). In calling for a “systematic, unbroken” practice that is “never before ques-
tioned” by Congress, Justice Frankfurter sets a high bar and appears to require both factors 
for past practice to count at all. Quite commonly, however, constitutional actors relying on 
past practice take a looser approach and require less robust levels of past practice and/or ac-
quiescence. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (quoting the 
Frankfurter language but also quoting looser language from United States v. Midwest Oil 
Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915), about the need for a “‘long-continued practice, known to and 
acquiesced in by Congress’” and in practice applying a fairly shallow inquiry into both fac-
tors); Libya Memorandum, supra note 1, at 4–9 (quoting Justice Frankfurter’s reference to 
the historical “gloss” but not further quoting his stringent requirements for this gloss to be 
satisfied). 
45 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 23, at 432–47. 
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many areas of constitutional law,46 it is rarely seen as such in the context 
of the separation of foreign affairs powers—even though these powers 
are the ones most directly connected to international law. 
This fact is evident from a look at the extensive scholarship in the last 
decade on the role of international law in constitutional interpretation. 
Except for some work on the conduct of hostilities,47 this scholarship 
does not discuss international law’s role in the separation of powers, 
other than to the extent that it is an input for other principles of constitu-
tional interpretation. Professor Cleveland, for example, shows at length 
how international law serves as an input for interpreting clauses in the 
Constitution that relate to the separation of powers,48 but when consider-
ing the role that international law can play as a “background principle 
for constitutional analysis,” she does not include the separation of pow-
ers in the many areas of constitutional law that she covers.49 Another 
lengthy historical treatment of international law in constitutional inter-
pretation by Professors Steven Calabresi and Stephanie Zimdahl finds 
that the Supreme Court “rarely cites foreign sources of law in structural 
constitutional cases,” with the exception of some federalism decisions.50 
 
46 See Cleveland, supra note 7, at 33–62. 
47 Professor Ingrid Wuerth, for example, argues that international law can be a valuable 
“second-order tool of constitutional interpretation” in assessing the scope of the President’s 
Commander-in-Chief powers. Wuerth, supra note 10, at 74–82. Nonetheless, even with re-
gard to the conduct of hostilities, much of the literature considering the relationship between 
international law and presidential power does not consider the role that international law 
might play as a direct principle of constitutional interpretation in the separation of powers. 
Rather, it looks at (1) how international law influences the interpretation of congressional 
statutes that in turn enable or constrain the President, for example, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 517–22 (2004) (plurality opinion) (relying on the law of war in interpreting a con-
gressional statute); or (2) how international law serves as a direct principle of constitutional 
interpretation with regard to individual rights, for example, id. at 531 (“[T]he law of war and 
the realities of combat may render [certain] detentions both necessary and appropriate, and 
our due process analysis need not blink at those realities.”).  
48 See Cleveland, supra note 7, at 12–27 (covering separation-of-powers related issues 
where the Constitution makes “express reference to international law or to a concept of in-
ternational law”). 
49 Id. at 33–63; see also id. at 63–87 (treating individual rights related issues in a separate 
section, but with an analysis that similarly shows international law’s use as a background 
principle of constitutional interpretation).  
50 Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign 
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 
47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 743, 906 (2005). For examples of other scholarship that look broad-
ly at the role of international law in constitutional interpretation but either do not address the 
separation of powers or treat international law mainly as an input for other principles of in-
terpretation in that context, see generally Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of 
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There are several possible reasons why international law might not be 
seen as a relevant principle for resolving separation-of-powers disputes 
by those who treat it as such in other areas of constitutional law. Perhaps 
international law is not and has not been particularly relevant to separa-
tion-of-powers issues for structural reasons. International law is some-
times said to speak to the substance of what states can and cannot do ra-
ther than to the process by which they do it. Since the separation of 
powers is a question of internal process, international law might not shed 
any light upon it. Professor Vicki Jackson, for example, claims that “in-
ternational law simply does not address many important constitutional 
issues having to do with the structure of government.”51 But this claim 
suggests too strong a divide between substance and process. While in-
ternational law may not dictate the constitutional structures of govern-
ment, it may influence these structures. For one thing, not all interna-
tional law is about substance. Some of it does have to do with process, 
such as default rules governing treaty-making and other communications 
between nations. For another thing, even where international law is sub-
stantive, nations might benefit from using it in designing their internal 
structural rules. Actions that violate international law, for example, are 
likely to generate more international friction than actions that comply 
with international law, and so nations might wish to set a higher internal 
threshold for engaging in such actions. 
Another possible explanation for why international law is not thought 
of as a principle for resolving separation-of-powers disputes is that the 
Supreme Court has done little, if anything, to use it as such. Scholars in-
terested in the role of international law in constitutional interpretation 
have focused almost exclusively on the Supreme Court and its approach 
to constitutional interpretation. Professors Cleveland, Calabresi, and 
Zimdahl, for example, define their projects on the role of international 
law in constitutional interpretation in terms of the Supreme Court’s ju-
risprudence on the subject.52 The scholarly focus on the Supreme Court 
 
Our Law, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 43 (2004); Larsen, supra note 19, at 1283–87; Parrish, supra note 
19, at 638–42; see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 82, 82 (2004) (“Sound constitutional interpretation com-
bines other constitutional principles and structures with conceptions derived from contempo-
rary international practice.”). 
51 Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law and Transnational Comparisons: The Youngstown 
Decision and American Exceptionalism, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 191, 212 (2006). 
52  Calebresi & Zimdahl, supra note 50, at 748–56; Cleveland, supra note 7, at 2–12. The 
other sources cited in supra note 50 also focus overwhelmingly on the Supreme Court. (For 
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is understandable, since it is the governmental body that plays the great-
est overall role in U.S. constitutional law today. But this focus may also 
underemphasize the role of international law in areas of constitutional 
law that the Supreme Court is more hesitant about addressing. Chief 
among these areas is the distribution of foreign affairs powers between 
Congress and the President. While the Supreme Court does sometimes 
address this distribution, it does so rarely, cautiously, and often only af-
ter longstanding practices have been established by the political branch-
es. To see this practice, however—and to see if international law plays a 
role in its creation—we must look to the constitutional interpretations by 
members of Congress and the Executive branch. 
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXECUTIVE POWER 
This Part looks at the role that international law has played in shaping 
the separation of powers in three key areas of foreign relations law: 
recognition, war powers, and treaty-making. For reasons mentioned 
above, it focuses largely on constitutional decision-making by Congress 
and the executive branch. In all of these areas, I find that international 
law has influenced the constitutional separation of powers in ways that 
go beyond simply serving as an input for other principles of interpreta-
tion. Importantly, rather than being neutral, the influence of international 
law has typically served to strengthen the President’s powers vis-à-vis 
Congress. Thus, though it may seem counterintuitive, the imperial Presi-
dency of today owes something to international law. 
The history of recognition, war powers, and treaty-making in the 
United States could each fill many volumes. My review here is neces-
sarily selective, and two caveats in particular apply. First, although I 
cover all three of the roles discussed in Part I that international law has 
played in shaping the constitutional division of foreign affairs powers, I 
pay particular attention to international law’s role as a direct principle of 
constitutional interpretation and as an extra-constitutional source of le-
gitimacy. I do this because these roles are the least accepted, and thus 
the most interesting, as a matter of legal doctrine today. Second, I most-
 
an interesting recent exception focusing on the role of comparative law in the process of 
congressional legislation-making, see a piece by Katerina Linos, Legislative Borrowing, 106 
Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 149 (2012).) Constitutional scholarship more generally, however, is 
increasingly taking into account the role of the political branches in shaping constitutional 
law. E.g., Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitu-
tional Meaning (1999). 
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ly discuss moments of constitutional decision-making where the deci-
sion-makers took international law into account. This over-emphasizes 
the direct influence of international law in the constitutional separation 
of powers, since I do not give equal attention to moments that lack evi-
dence of decision-makers taking international law into account. My aim 
here is to show that international law has mattered in shaping the domes-
tic separation of powers, not to try to quantify the precise degree across 
history that it has done so. 
A. Recognition 
Over the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century, some of the most 
vexing foreign affairs questions confronting the United States were is-
sues of recognition. Should it recognize the revolutionary government of 
France? Venezuela and its neighbors as they broke away from Spain? 
Texas? Cuba? These questions implicated U.S. security since, as Presi-
dent Jackson observed in relation to Texas, “the power of originally rec-
ognizing a new state [is a] power the exercise of which is equivalent, 
under some circumstances, to a declaration of war.”53 Yet the text of the 
Constitution does not provide clear guidance as to which branch of gov-
ernment can exercise this power and under what circumstances. The 
President is vested with the executive power of the United States and is 
specifically given the power to receive ambassadors; the President and 
the Senate between them have the power to make treaties and appoint 
ambassadors; and Congress has the power to regulate foreign commerce 
and the powers conferred by the necessary and proper clause. The power 
of recognition must lie somewhere, but it is not obvious which branch or 
branches possess it. 
Starting immediately after the Framing, international law played a 
role in leading U.S. constitutional interpreters to conclude that the Presi-
dent could exercise the power of recognition. President Washington re-
lied partly on international law as a source of extra-constitutional legiti-
macy in recognizing the revolutionary government of France without 
congressional approval. Later, over the course of the nineteenth century, 
the executive branch moved increasingly towards the position that it was 
solely entrusted with the power of recognition. Here, again, international 
law played a role, primarily as a direct principle of constitutional inter-
 
53 Andrew Jackson, Message to Congress Regarding Texas (Dec. 21, 1836), in 1 John Bas-
sett Moore, A Digest of International Law 99 (1906). 
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pretation supporting the executive’s position. By a few decades into the 
twentieth century, the view that the executive branch had the sole power 
of recognition was widely accepted. 
1. President Washington’s Recognition of France 
The French Revolution first presented the question of which part or 
parts of the federal government held the constitutional power to recog-
nize foreign powers. Following the overthrow of King Louis XVI, the 
Washington Administration had to decide whether to recall its ambassa-
dor as European countries were doing, whether to continue the payments 
to France’s revolutionary government for war debts it owed to France, 
and whether to receive the ambassador sent by that government—
practical questions that effectively also raised the question of whether or 
not to recognize the new government of France.54 
The decisions made by the Washington Administration would ulti-
mately become a key precedent for claims of a concurrent or even exclu-
sive presidential recognition power. Importantly, however, the focus 
within the Washington Administration in resolving these questions was 
not on the constitutional power of the President to make these decisions 
but rather on the international legal obligations of the United States. In a 
recent pair of articles, Professor Robert Reinstein has shown how deci-
sion-making within the Washington Administration on this issue was 
driven by the aim of strict compliance with international law.55 As set 
forth by the theorist Emer de Vattel—a favorite source on international 
law for the Founding generation—nations were to “take for their rule the 
circumstance of actual possession” in deciding whether to engage in dip-
lomatic relations with new governments.56 This principle of international 
 
54 See Robert J. Reinstein, Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the Washington 
Administration, 46 U. Rich. L. Rev. 373, 422–26 (2012) [hereinafter Reinstein, Executive 
Power]; Robert J. Reinstein, Recognition: A Case Study on the Original Understanding of 
Executive Power, 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 801, 839–40 (2011) [hereinafter Reinstein, Recogni-
tion]. 
55 Reinstein, Executive Power, supra note 54, at 380, 422–28; Reinstein, Recognition, su-
pra note 54, at 839–42. 
56 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations bk. IV, § 68 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore, 
eds., Tomas Nugent, trans., 2008); see also Reinstein, Recognition, supra note 54, at 839. 
Although the Washington Administration viewed international law as requiring recognition 
where there was de facto possession, this view may not have accurately reflected the Euro-
pean custom of the time. See Julius Goebel, Jr., The Recognition Policy of the United States 
95–96, 98, 114–15 (1915) (arguing that the U.S. approach did not in fact represent existing 
international law, though it shaped international law going forward). 
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law, as Washington Administration officials understood it, played a key 
role in their deliberations. When Secretary of the Treasury Alexander 
Hamilton, who was no fan of the revolutionary government, asked John 
Jay for advice on whether there was some basis for limiting the recep-
tion of the ambassador sent by the revolutionary government, Jay of-
fered him no support. Instead, Jay emphasized that “they who actually 
administer the government of any nation, are by foreign nations to be 
regarded as its lawful Rulers” and insisted that it is the “[d]uty . . . of the 
United States, strictly to observe that conduct towards all nations, which 
the laws of nations prescribe.”57 
As these recognition-related questions unfolded over 1792 and 1793, 
it is striking how little Washington Administration officials appeared to 
reflect on whether the President could constitutionally make recognition 
decisions on his own. The first written constitutional justification that I 
am aware of occurs in the essays of Pacificus, written anonymously by 
Alexander Hamilton some months after the recognition questions were 
resolved. Hamilton remarked that “the right of the Executive to receive 
ambassadors and other public Ministers . . . . includes that of judging, in 
the case of a Revolution of Government in a foreign Country, whether 
the new rulers are competent organs of the National Will, and ought to 
[be] recognized, or not.”58 One might infer from this argument, along 
with the absence of other debate on the issue, that there really was no 
constitutional question—that the constitutional right of the President to 
make these recognition decisions on his own was so settled in light of 
the Receive Ambassadors Clause that there was simply no need to dis-
cuss the issue. But this conclusion seems unlikely given the treatment of 
the Receive Ambassadors Clause during the debates over the ratification 
of the Constitution. At that time, none other than Hamilton described the 
clause as “more of a matter of dignity than of authority. It is a circum-
stance which will be without consequence in the administration of the 
government.”59 In light of this, Hamilton’s later treatment of the Receive 
 
57 Draft Proclamation prepared by John Jay, enclosed in Letter from John Jay to Alexander 
Hamilton (Apr. 11, 1793), in 14 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 309 (Harold C. Syrett & 
Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1969) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted); see also Reinstein, 
Executive Power, supra note 54, at 426 (discussing this exchange). For a discussion of other 
Washington Administration correspondence emphasizing that diplomatic relations should 
turn on actual possession, see Reinstein, Executive Power, supra note 54, at 422–23.  
58 Pacificus Number I (June 29, 1793), in Pacificus-Helvidus Debate, supra note 30, at 8, 
14 (alteration in original).  
59 The Federalist No. 69, at 341 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008). 
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Ambassadors Clause as a positive source of recognition power seems 
suspiciously like a post hoc justification. 
The absence of focus on the constitutional question suggests that in-
ternational law served here as an extra-constitutional source of legitima-
cy. It seems that the Washington Administration officials simply focused 
on making sure the United States was obeying international law, as a re-
sponsible nation would do, without even initially digesting whether or 
not they were the proper actors within the nation to make these deci-
sions. In doing so, however, the Washington Administration established 
the important constitutional precedent that the President could make at 
least some recognition determinations by himself. 
2. The “Sole Organ” Principle and the Birth of the Idea of Exclusive 
Presidential Recognition 
The recognition of France by the Washington Administration estab-
lished that Presidents could make recognition decisions on their own, at 
least where new governments were concerned, but left open whether the 
President’s recognition power was sole or shared with Congress. Over 
the next half-century, Presidents made the most important recognition 
decisions in conjunction with Congress, but the idea of an exclusive 
presidential power of recognition began to arise, due partly to the use of 
international law as a direct principle of constitutional interpretation. 
This idea tied into the developing principle that the President speaks as 
the “sole organ” for the United States as a matter of international law. 
In a speech before the House of Representatives in 1800, John Mar-
shall described the President as “the sole organ of the nation in its exter-
nal relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”60 Alt-
hough Marshall did not specify the basis for this claim, it lies at the 
intersection of international law and Lockean theories of executive pow-
er. International law at the time required that states maintain a single 
“representative authority” with which other states could raise interna-
 
60 10 Annals of Cong. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. Marshall). Precursors include Pacifi-
cus Number I (June 29, 1793), in Pacificus-Helvidus Debate, supra note 30, at 11 (describing 
the executive branch as “the organ of intercourse between the [United States] and foreign 
Nations” (emphasis omitted)); Jefferson’s Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting 
Diplomatic Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 378, 379 
(Julian P. Boyd et al. eds, 1961) (asserting that the “transaction of business with foreign na-
tions is Executive altogether”); cf. Act of July 27, 1789, § 1, 1 Stat. 28 (1789) (establishing 
the Department of Foreign Affairs to conduct communications with foreign nations accord-
ing to the President’s orders). 
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tional legal concerns.61 Interpreting the Constitution to be in compliance 
with this principle of international law, as Marshall and others appear to 
have done, the question arose whether Congress or the President served 
as this authority. Under the Articles of Confederation, this role neces-
sarily fell to the Continental Congress, but there were strong arguments 
in favor of the President having this authority under the Constitution. 
Not only did John Locke’s theory of executive power suggest that this 
role fell naturally to the executive,62 but in addition, the President was 
favored by strong functional arguments—what if an urgent issue came 
up and Congress was not in session?—and by the fact that at least some 
direct communication between the President and foreign governments 
was clearly contemplated by the Receive Ambassadors Clause. These 
factors suggested that the President should have some role as the repre-
sentative of the United States to foreign government, and the interna-
tional law requirement of a single representative authority elevated the 
President to holding this power solely. The President’s role as the “sole 
organ” (which numerous constitutional actors since Marshall have ech-
 
61 Quincy Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations 15 (1922). This representa-
tive authority could perhaps have been thought of as the federal government generally, see 1 
Op. Att’y Gen. 522 (1852) (“The people of the United States seem to have contemplated the 
national government as the sole and exclusive organ of intercourse with foreign nations.”), 
but the further requirement under the law of nations that communication between nations 
happen between ministers, see Vattel, supra note 56, at bk. 4, § 55, furthered a more specific 
understanding of the representative authority as the entity within the government that super-
vised ministers. See Wright, supra, at 23. 
62 See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 31, at 266–68. Professors Prakash and Ramsey treat 
Lockean theories of executive power as the basis of the sole organ doctrine. But international 
law has also played an important role, in two respects. First, international law and theories of 
executive power, particularly those powers related to foreign affairs, were closely inter-
twined, with some theorists justifying one by way of the other. E.g., 1 William Blackstone, 
Commentaries *257 (explaining that the king has the treaty-making prerogative because “it 
is by the law of nations essential to the goodness of a [treaty] that it be made by the sover-
eign power”); see Vattel, supra note 56, at bk. 4, § 55 (identifying international law norms 
governing communications between nations). At the very least, international law identified 
the need for a single representative, even if theories of executive power signaled the actor 
that would fill that need. Second, in practice, important actors in American foreign relations 
law have rooted the sole organ doctrine primarily in international law. Quincy Wright’s trea-
tise on The Control of American Foreign Relations Power, for example, makes “the re-
quirement of international law that states maintain a definite authority to which foreign states 
may complain of violations of international law and from which they may expect satisfaction 
on the basis of that law alone” a centerpiece of his entire argument. Wright, supra note 61, at 
15. 
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oed63) in turn ultimately bolstered arguments for a sole presidential 
recognition power and for other presidential foreign affairs powers. It 
has been perhaps the most important principle derived from international 
law to influence the constitutional separation of powers. 
During the decades that followed the Washington Administration, 
however, both political branches took a mostly cooperative approach to 
the recognition power. James Monroe sought the backing of Congress in 
recognizing Latin American countries breaking away from Spain, and 
Andrew Jackson accepted a congressional role in the recognition of 
Texas as a matter of political desirability (although noting that he re-
served comment on the constitutional question).64 From the congression-
al side, Henry Clay produced a report claiming that recognition could be 
accomplished in multiple ways, including exclusively by the President, 
by the President and the Senate together, or by Congress.65 This period 
of cooperation was perhaps helped by the fact that, at least prior to the 
Civil War, the constitutional actors largely deemed themselves as con-
strained by what the Washington Administration had viewed as the in-
ternational legal principles governing recognition.66 
Yet hints of an exclusive presidential power of recognition were 
emerging. Secretaries of State John Quincy Adams and William Seward 
asserted that the recognition power lay exclusively with the President,67 
 
63 The Senate acknowledged this proposition early on, see S. Foreign Relations Comm., 
56th Cong., Rep. of Feb. 15, 1816, reprinted in 6 Compilation of Reports of Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 1789–1901, at 21 (1901) (“The President is the con-
stitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign nations.”), and the Su-
preme Court famously embraced it in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 
304, 319 (1936).  
64 President Monroe, Message to Congress of Mar. 8, 1822, in 1 Moore, supra note 53, at 
245; President Jackson, Message to Congress of Dec. 21, 1836, in id. at 99. 
65 See Julius Goebel, Jr., The Recognition Policy of the United States 149–51 (1915) 
(quoting Clay’s report and discussing the context at length). 
66 See supra notes 55–57 (describing the Washington Administration view); Goebel, supra 
note 56, at 113–15, 171–72 (claiming that there was faithful adherence of the United States 
to this approach until the Civil War, in which the United States was understandably resistant 
to de facto possession giving rise to recognition). But see Robert Reinstein, Slavery, Execu-
tive Power and International Law: The Haitian Revolution and American Constitutionalism, 
53 Am. J. Legal Hist. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 65–71, 87–92) (on file with author) 
(arguing that the failure of U.S. presidents to recognize Haiti as the nineteenth century un-
folded is a counterexample to Goebel’s claim). 
67 John Quincy Adams, Memoirs 205–06 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1875); Letter from 
William H. Seward, Sec’y of State, to William L. Dayton, U.S. Minister to France (Apr. 7, 
1864), in The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 
1864, at 528 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1865). But see H.R. Rep. No. 38-129, at 11 
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and Presidents increasingly emphasized their “sole organ” power. In one 
notable instance, Ulysses S. Grant vetoed two trivial joint resolutions by 
Congress—resolutions that simply responded to congratulations sent by 
foreign nations—on the ground that “[t]he Constitution of the United 
States, following the established usage of nations, has indicated the 
President as the agent to represent the national sovereignty in its inter-
course with foreign powers.”68 This language suggests that international 
law, or at least international custom, was serving as a direct principle of 
constitutional interpretation with regard to the power to deal with other 
states. 
3. The Recognition of Cuba as a Separation-of-Powers Debate 
International law played a role in perhaps the sharpest exchange be-
tween Congress and the executive branch over recognition during the 
nineteenth century—the debate over whether and when to recognize Cu-
ba during its war of independence. In December 1896, the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee voted to send a resolution to the floor of the 
Senate recognizing Cuba as independent. This decision came well before 
the President was ready to recognize Cuba and prompted an immediate, 
angry rebuttal by Secretary of State Richard Olney. “The power to rec-
ognize the so-called Republic of Cuba as an independent State,” Olney 
claimed, “rest[s] exclusively with the Executive.”69 His remarks in turn 
provoked outrage among Senators, and helped fuel a lengthy floor de-
bate over the constitutional allocation of the recognition power. Senators 
on both sides of the issue drew on international law in their constitution-
al interpretation. 
 
(1864) (disagreeing with Seward’s assertions of an exclusive presidential recognition pow-
er).  
68 Ulysses S. Grant, Veto Message of Jan. 26, 1877, in Veto Messages of the President of 
the United States with the Action of Congress Thereon 407 (Washington, D.C., Government 
Printing Office 1886) (emphasis added). 
69 Olney Opposes Recognition of Cuba by America, Norfolk Virginian, Dec. 20, 1896, at 
1. Two years later, the Solicitor of the State Department published a law review article that 
took a somewhat more nuanced view of the issue. He emphasized that “while the faculty of 
recognition depends on the internal public law of a State, yet in the forum of international 
law its exercise is considered as usually an executive function.” W. L. Penfield, Recognition 
of a New State—Is It an Executive Function?, 32 Am. L. Rev. 390, 390 (1898); see also id. 
at 396. His ultimate conclusion, however, was that since, in his view, international law did 
not require any particular style of recognition, a statute passed by Congress and signed by 
the President would constitute recognition. See id. at 408.  
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In asserting a congressional power of recognition, Senator Augustus 
Bacon of Florida relied on international law’s status as domestic law in 
the United States. Bacon emphasized that “[i]nternational law is a part of 
the law of this land and will be administered by the courts of this coun-
try, both Federal and State, without any distinct legal enactment either 
by Congress or by any State government.”70 Because international law is 
domestic law, he reasoned, Congress, as the body in charge of making 
domestic law, should have the responsibility for the international legal 
decisions such as recognition.71 Bacon’s structural argument was met 
with skepticism, however, as other Senators pointed out that his reason-
ing suggested that only Congress should make recognition decisions, 
while past practice (including the Washington Administration’s recogni-
tion of France) suggested that the President had at least a concurrent 
power to do so.72 
More powerfully, Senator Eugene Hale of Maine used international 
law as a principle of constitutional interpretation in arguing for a sole 
presidential recognition power. In essence, he argued on the floor and in 
a written memorandum that the sole organ doctrine meant that the con-
stitutional power of recognition lay with the President: 
Resolutions of . . . legislative departments upon diplomatic matters 
have no status in international law. In the department of international 
law, therefore, properly speaking, a congressional recognition of bel-
ligerency or independence would be a nullity. . . . Congress can help 
the Cuban insurgents by legislation in many ways, but it cannot help 
them legitimately by mere declarations, or by attempts to engage in 
diplomatic negotiations, if our interpretation of the Constitution is cor-
rect.73 
 
70 29 Cong. Rec. 747 (1897) (statement of Sen. Bacon). This language bears a striking re-
semblance to the Supreme Court’s contemporary assertion that “[i]nternational law is part of 
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate ju-
risdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their deter-
mination.” The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 
U.S. 113, 143 (1895). 
71 29 Cong. Rec. 747 (1897) (statement of Sen. Bacon); see also id. at 746. 
72 Id. at 747–49 (exchanges between Sens. Bacon, Gray, and Platt).  
73 29 Cong. Rec. 670 (1987), also available as S. Doc. No. 54-56 (1987). There is a touch 
of originalism in Senator Hale’s argument, as he asserts that “[a]ll of these considerations 
were familiar to the statesmen who framed the Federal Constitution,” but the argument is not 
framed as a solely originalist one. Id. In addition to Senator Hale, Senator John Morgan of 
Alabama also relied on international law in interpreting the Constitution to give the President 
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Ultimately, the showdown over the recognition of Cuba turned into a 
compromise. The Senate did not pass this resolution, and just over a year 
later, President McKinley and Congress agreed on a resolution acknowl-
edging the “people of the island of Cuba” as “free and independent”—
language which did not explicitly recognize Cuba but came carefully 
close to doing so.74 The arguments made by Senator Hale, however, 
found twentieth-century supporters and helped move the practice to-
wards an exclusive presidential power of recognition. 
4. Exclusive Presidential Recognition in the Twentieth Century 
The theory of exclusive presidential recognition power crystallized as 
the twentieth century unfolded. During this period, scholars and consti-
tutional actors followed Senator Hale in relying on international law as a 
principle of constitutional interpretation supporting an exclusive presi-
dential recognition power. 
The importance of international law as a background principle for in-
terpreting the constitutional allocation of recognition powers is apparent 
in the writings of two particularly influential scholars of foreign affairs 
powers: Edwin Corwin and Philip Quincy Wright. In concluding in 1917 
that the recognition power lay only with the President—acting alone or 
in conjunction with the Senate—Corwin relied on Senator Hale’s argu-
ment that “‘[r]esolutions of . . . legislative departments upon diplomatic 
matters have no status in international law.’”75 Quincy Wright similarly 
defended an exclusive presidential recognition power based on the Pres-
ident’s role as the representative organ for the United States under inter-
 
the recognition power as a “mere piece of diplomatic authority which he derives under the 
law of nations, which are recognized in the Constitution.” 29 Cong. Rec. 684 (1897) (state-
ment of Sen. Morgan). 
74 15 James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of Presidents, 
1789–1897, at 6448 (New York, Bureau of National Literature, Inc. 1897); see also Senate 
Discusses Cuba, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1898, at 3 (noting that a version of the resolution that 
would explicitly have recognized Cuba did not pass). The joint resolution also authorized the 
President to use force against Spain to further Cuban independence, see id., and later defend-
ers of an exclusive presidential power of recognition would argue that this resolution was an 
authorization of intervention only, not an act of recognition. E.g., Wright, supra note 61, at 
271. 
75 Edwin S. Corwin, The President’s Control of Foreign Relations 80 (1917) (quoting Sen-
ator Hale’s memorandum); see also id. at 82 (alluding again to the fact that Congress lacked 
the power to communicate as a matter of international law on behalf of the United States). 
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national law.76 Significantly, Wright saw international law not only as 
the basis for a presidential power of recognition, but also as a potential 
constraint on this power. More specifically, he suggested that the Presi-
dent’s recognition powers might be constitutionally limited to situations 
where recognition was in fact warranted by international law—for ex-
ample, to situations where the government to be recognized did in fact 
have territorial control.77 
Like Corwin and Quincy Wright, the Supreme Court came to rely on 
the sole organ doctrine in justifying the President’s recognition powers. 
In United States v. Belmont, the Supreme Court considered whether 
President Franklin Roosevelt had the power to make an executive 
agreement ancillary to his sole decision to recognize the Soviet Union 
and its communist government. In upholding the President’s actions as 
within his constitutional powers, the Court emphasized his “authority to 
speak as the sole organ of that government.”78 
Belmont did not mention any role for Congress in recognition, though 
it did not expressly reject such a role either. Eventually, however, the 
Supreme Court would go further in dicta in Banco National de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino to suggest that the recognition power is “exclusively a func-
tion of the Executive.”79 The Court did not further explain this dicta, 
simply making this statement in passing without any citation. With the 
development of this dicta, however, those seeking to justify the Presi-
dent’s sole recognition power no longer needed to rely directly on inter-
national law as a background principle of constitutional interpretation. 
Instead, they could simply cite this dicta as demonstrating that constitu-
tional provisions such as the Receive Ambassador Clause entrusted the 
recognition power to the President.80 The role that international law had 
 
76 See Wright, supra note 61, at 268; see also id. at 273 (quoting Senator Hale for the 
proposition that legislative pronouncements lack status under international law). 
77 Id. at 269–70. 
78 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937). 
79 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964). This same shift can be seen from the Restatement (Second) of 
Foreign Relations Law, which described the President as having the recognition power with-
out expressly discussing whether Congress had a concurrent recognition power, to the Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which treats the President’s recognition power 
as exclusive. See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 106(2) (1965); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 204 (1987). 
80 E.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 204 cmt. a 
& reporters’ note 1 (1987). 
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played in shaping the constitutional allocation of the recognition powers 
thus faded into obscurity. 
B. War Powers 
The text of the Constitution gives Congress the power to “declare 
War,”81 and both its drafting history and the practice of the first Presi-
dents indicates an original understanding that congressional authoriza-
tion was needed for the United States to initiate hostilities. The reality 
today is far different. Presidents now consider themselves constitutional-
ly entitled to launch significant attacks on other countries without con-
gressional authorization, provided that doing so furthers what they con-
sider to be the interests of the United States. 
As a legal matter, Office of Legal Counsel memoranda now justify 
this shift by reference to the historical gloss. A close look at the past 
practices that underlie this gloss, however, reveals that international law 
has helped shape the constitutional distribution of war powers in all 
three of the ways discussed in Part I—as an input for other principles of 
constitutional interpretation, as a direct principle of constitutional inter-
pretation, and as an extra-constitutional source of legitimacy.82 As Ed-
win Corwin once observed, “from the first it has devolved upon [the 
President] to protect American rights and to discharge American duties 
under the law of nations; and, as commonly happens, the path of duty 
became in time a road to power.”83 Among other practices, international 
 
81 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
82 I focus here only on international law’s role in shaping decisions to use force in the first 
place. International law has also played an important role in shaping the constitutional allo-
cation of war powers with regard to the conduct of existing hostilities. As early as Brown v. 
United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814), the Supreme Court used international law in 
interpreting the constitutional scope of the President’s powers to conduct hostilities. Id. at 
123–29 (concluding that, in the absence of specific congressional authorization, the Presi-
dent did not have the constitutional power to seize enemy property within the United States 
in violation of a “modern” rule of international law). Perhaps because the Supreme Court has 
weighed in more frequently on the separation of powers with regard to the conduct of hostili-
ties than with regard to the other areas of foreign relations law explored in this Article, exist-
ing scholarship has already explored how international law has helped shape the constitu-
tional allocation of powers with regard to the conduct of hostilities. See supra note 47. 
83 Corwin, supra note 31, at 236 (suggesting that the Take Care Clause helped bolster this 
growth in presidential power); see also id. at 240–41 (“Thanks to the same capacity to base 
action directly on his own reading of international law . . . the President has been able to 
gather to himself powers with respect to warmaking which ill accord with the specific dele-
gation in the Constitution of the war-declaring power to Congress.”). 
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law helped justify the many minor engagements undertaken solely under 
presidential authority, as well as more major commitments undertaken 
by Presidents acting without Congress in asserted responses to treaty 
commitments of the United States. 
1. Minor Engagements 
Starting early in the nineteenth century, U.S. armed forces periodical-
ly carried out small-scale attacks without congressional authorization. 
For purposes of constitutional law, the most important of these attacks 
was probably the bombardment of Greytown, Nicaragua by the U.S. na-
val ship Cyane, nominally in retaliation for an unpunished assault on an 
American diplomat.84 The bombardment of Greytown is significant both 
because it was a comparatively substantial use of force—the Cyane de-
stroyed the town—and because it gave rise to a rare court decision on 
presidential authority to use force. Written by Supreme Court Justice 
Samuel Nelson riding circuit, Durand v. Hollins is a case that still ap-
pears in leading textbooks covering the constitutional division of war 
powers.85 
In deciding that the President had the constitutional power to author-
ize the bombardment of Greytown, Justice Nelson observed that: 
As the executive head of the nation, the president is made the only le-
gitimate organ of the general government, to open and carry on corre-
spondence or negotiations with foreign nations, in matters concerning 
the interests of the country or of its citizens. It is to him, also, the citi-
zens abroad must look for protection of person and of property, and 
for the faithful execution of the laws existing and intended for their 
protection.86 
This passage hints at two principles of international law. One—the 
one directly relevant to the case—is the principle that nations are re-
sponsible for protecting their citizens from abuse and seeking repara-
tions or revenge for injuries to them.87 But international law does not di-
 
84 For a detailed account, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Descent into 
the Maelstrom, 1829–1861, at 117–21 (2005). 
85 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186); see also, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack 
L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law 232–33 (2011) (including this case). 
86 Durand, 8 F. Cas at 112. 
87 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations bk. II, § 71 (“Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly 
offends the state, which is bound to protect this citizen; and the sovereign of the latter should 
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rectly speak to what branch of government bears responsibility for ful-
filling this responsibility. To attribute this responsibility to the President, 
Justice Nelson draws an analogy to another principle of international 
law—the sole organ doctrine—reasoning that because the President acts 
as the sole organ under international law, he must also be responsible for 
fulfilling the international legal role of protecting U.S. citizens.88 
In Durand, Justice Nelson also noted that Greytown was “an irre-
sponsible and marauding community.”89 Although he did not elaborate 
on this point, there is an implication that it is appropriate for the Presi-
dent to independently authorize the use of force against such communi-
ties, as opposed to more responsible states. International law authorized 
the punishment of “mischievous” nations,90 and in any event such com-
munities might be less akin to nations than to pirates, who were under-
stood to be the enemy of all. These international legal principles in turn 
might influence the constitutional allocation of powers, either by sug-
gesting that attacks on such communities did not amount to “war” or be-
cause the President would be independently authorized to conduct these 
attacks under his increasingly recognized role as the constitutional en-
forcer of international law. 
Although Durand gives only a hint of these arguments, they were 
made more expressly by constitutional actors in the political branches in 
relation to the bombardment of Greytown. President Franklin Pierce lik-
ened Greytown to a “piratical resort of outlaws” and emphasized that it 
“did not profess to belong to any regular government, and had, in fact, 
no recognized dependence on or connection with anyone to which the 
United States or their injured citizens might apply for redress or which 
could be held responsible in any way for the outrages committed.”91 In a 
debate in the Senate a few years later, Senator Jacob Collamer asserted 
that while the President might have the constitutional power to use force 
 
avenge his wrongs, punish the aggressor, and, if possible, oblige him to make full repara-
tion.”). 
88 For a discussion of some other instances where the international legal principle of pro-
tecting or avenging one’s citizens is used to bolster the President’s power to authorize the 
use of aggressive force in the nineteenth century, see Currie, supra note 84, at 122–23.  
89 8 F. Cas. at 112. 
90 Vattel, supra note 87, at bk II, § 70. 
91 Franklin Pierce, Message to Congress of Dec. 4, 1854, in 5 Richardson, supra note 74, at 
282; see also Currie, supra note 84, at 119–21 (noting the constitutional implications). Presi-
dent Buchanan would later back away from his predecessor’s justification of the attack. See 
Louis Fisher, The War Power: Original and Contemporary 20 (2009). 
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against “barbarous and uncivilized people” like the inhabitants of Grey-
town, he could not do so “in relation to a civilized people, a people with 
whom we have reciprocated diplomatic relations.”92 
International law thus provided a constitutionally significant distinc-
tion regarding what communities the President could use force against 
without the need for congressional authorization. This distinction mat-
tered beyond Greytown and can be found in the thinking of constitution-
al actors as late as President William Howard Taft. After observing that 
congressional authorization is only needed in “the case of a war of ag-
gression” against a foreign country, he went on to remark that:  
[W]hat constitutes an act of war [as a constitutional matter] . . . is 
sometimes a nice question of law and fact. It really seems to differ 
with the character of the nation whose relations with the United States 
are affected. The unstable condition as to law and order of some of the 
Central American republics creates different rules of international law 
from those that obtain in governments that can be depended upon to 
maintain their own peace and order.”93 
In essence, Taft used an evolving understanding of international law 
as an input for understanding the textual meaning of “war” in the Consti-
tution. His approach justified the independent use of force by the Presi-
dent in many contexts, but still required congressional authorization to 
initiate hostilities against stable countries. 
Important as these international-law-based distinctions may have 
been, however, they would ultimately get swallowed up by a more ex-
pansive understanding of presidential war powers—one which used the 
precedents created in line with these distinctions without recognizing 
their importance. One common approach taken by twentieth-century 
supporters of broad presidential war powers was to simply list all prior 
independent presidential uses of force without discussing the justifica-
tions given for them. In 1941, for example, Senator Connally of Texas 
offered up a list of “85 incidents” of presidential authorizations of mili-
 
92 Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1727 (1858). For another example, see Currie, supra 
note 84, at 115, 120 n.34 (noting that President Tyler viewed congressional authorization as 
needed for military intervention to protect American civilians, provided that the intervention 
would be “agst [sic] a civilized Nation”).  
93 William Howard Taft, The Presidency: Its Duties, Its Powers, Its Opportunities, and Its 
Limitations 86 (1916). 
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tary missions abroad without congressional authorization94 in the course 
of arguing that, prior to the U.S. entry into World War II, the President 
had the constitutional authority to send thousands of U.S. troops to Ice-
land to repel any German threat there. Senator Connally’s list included 
mostly minor uses of force, typically against non-state communities or 
the Central American countries considered distinctive for international 
law purposes by Taft. One entry reads, “Cuba 1823: [t]o pursue and 
break up an establishment of pirates,” and another, “Fiji Islands 1840: 
[t]o punish natives for an attack upon Americans.”95 But rather than con-
sidering the nuances of these practices, Senator Connally offered them 
up as wholesale endorsements of presidential power to use force abroad 
on behalf of U.S. interests. Such simplified aggregations would later be 
embraced by executive branch officials seeking to justify unilateral pres-
idential uses of force. 
2. Treaties as a Basis for Presidential Uses of Force 
Treaties have helped enhance the President’s war powers vis-à-vis 
Congress in three main ways. First, there is a longstanding constitutional 
debate about whether the President can use force without congressional 
approval that he would otherwise need where treaty commitments obli-
gate or, more commonly, authorize this use of force. The more widely 
accepted view today is that he cannot, but past precedents going the oth-
er way have informed the current scope of the President’s war powers. 
Second, where treaties authorize U.S. action, Presidents can use this fact 
as an extra-constitutional source of legitimacy that bolsters their argu-
ments in favor of the use of force. Third, in its early days, the U.N. 
Charter was deemed by some constitutional actors to influence the con-
stitutional allocation of power between the President and Congress not 
only in the two ways just suggested, but also by reshaping the interna-
tional law of war. 
The relationship between the congressional power to declare war and 
the treaty power shared by the President and the Senate hinges on 
whether congressional authorization for the use of force is needed where 
a treaty commits or authorizes the United States to go to war under cer-
 
94 87 Cong. Rec. 5930–31 (1941); see also id. at 5929 (making clear that the list focuses on 
presidential actions not specifically authorized by Congress). 
95 Id. at 5930. 
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tain conditions and these conditions have been satisfied.96 These ques-
tions first arose very early in U.S. constitutional history,97 but to date 
they have appeared most dramatically in relation to the Korean and Vi-
etnam Wars. 
In committing U.S. troops to the Korean War without congressional 
authorization, President Truman relied heavily on the fact that, in re-
sponse to North Korea’s attack, the U.N. Security Council had voted to 
recommend that Member States “furnish such assistance to [South Ko-
rea] as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore interna-
tional peace and security in the area.”98 The executive branch’s doctrinal 
use of the Security Council Resolution was two-fold. First, executive 
branch officials and supporters argued that, as a matter of constitutional 
doctrine, the Security Council Resolution removed any need for con-
gressional authorization. The State Department memorandum justifying 
the intervention argued that the President was authorized to carry out the 
Security Council’s recommendation under his Take Care Clause power 
and that doing so was a “paramount” interest of the United States.99 Sec-
ond, congressional supporters claimed that the Security Council Resolu-
tion had the effect of making the intervention a “police operation” rather 
than a “war” within the meaning of the Constitution100—in effect argu-
ing, as President Taft had done decades earlier, that evolving interna-
tional law shapes the meaning of “war” for constitutional purposes. But 
 
96 A precedential question is whether the United States can enter into such treaties in the 
first place. While this issue has been debated, see, e.g., 1 Westel Woodbury Willoughby, The 
Constitutional Law of the United States § 290 (1929), in practice U.S. treaties have done so. 
One Senate Foreign Relations Committee report has suggested that mutual defense and other 
such treaties should at least “implicitly” reserve a right for the United States to decide 
whether to act militarily, in order to preserve a role for the House of Representatives in 
warmaking. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 95-12, at 74 (1978). 
97 See Wright, supra note 61, at 227; Corwin, supra note 75, at 158–63. For a discussion of 
how this argument was used to justify President Roosevelt’s intervention in Cuba in 1906 
under the Platt Amendment, see Taft, supra note 93, at 74–76. 
98 S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/RES/83 (June 27, 1950). 
99 Dep’t of State, Memorandum of July 3, 1950, reprinted in H. Rep. No. 81-2495, at 61, 
65–67 (1950). The memorandum also argued that the intervention lay within the President’s 
sole authority based on the numerous nineteenth-century presidential uses of force, using the 
reasoning discussed supra note 94 and accompanying text. Id. at 64–65, 67–68. 
100 96 Cong. Rec. 9541 (1950) (statement of Sen. Flanders); see also Robert F. Turner, 
Truman, Korea, and the Constitution: Debunking the “Imperial President” Myth, 19 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 533, 576 (1996) (discussing the characterization of the Korean War as a 
“police action” by congressional supporters immediately following the Security Council 
Resolution and describing how President Truman ultimately appropriated this language). 
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these arguments all had weak points. Importantly, the Security Council 
had not undertaken action directly nor had it required anything of Mem-
ber States. Instead, it had simply recommended that Member States take 
action—facts which weakened the Take Care Clause argument because 
it meant the United States had no international legal obligation to carry 
out the Security Council mandate and which weakened the “police ac-
tion” argument because it meant that for all practical purposes the re-
sponse would come from individual states rather than directly from a 
centralized international authority. Moreover, the legislative history be-
hind the approval of the U.N. Charter in the Senate and of its imple-
menting legislation in Congress more generally indicated a congression-
al assumption that further congressional action would occur before the 
United States used force on behalf of the Security Council.101 
But while the doctrinal arguments were weak, the extra-constitutional 
legitimacy conveyed by the Security Council Resolution was strong. At 
least initially, members of Congress were nearly unanimous in applaud-
ing the intervention in Korea102—and while some of this approval rested 
on anti-communist fervor, much of it also rested on a desire to bolster 
the recently created United Nations.103 Senator Ralph Flanders, for ex-
ample, emphasized that he did not think the President had the power to 
initiate such a use of force under “ordinary circumstances,” but that the 
use of force here “gets its justification from the preservation of the use-
fulness and very existence of the United Nations.”104 Majority Leader 
 
101 In particular, Congress assumed that there would be a further agreement with the Unit-
ed Nations, approved by the Senate or Congress, whereby the United States placed a certain 
number of troops at the Security Council’s disposal. The President would then be able to au-
thorize use of these troops, but any additional troop use would need further congressional 
approval. This agreement, however, was never made. See Michael J. Glennon, The Constitu-
tion and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 85 Am. J. Int’l L. 74, 77–81 (1991). But 
see Turner, supra note 100, at 559–63 (arguing that even in the absence of the additional 
agreement, the President has the constitutional authority to commit troops on behalf of the 
United States). 
102 Turner, supra note 100, at 568–70. 
103 E.g., 96 Cong. Rec. 9539 (1950) (statement of Sen. Knowland) (expressing anti-
communist views); id. at 9540 (statement of Sen. Stennis) (voicing pride that “we are operat-
ing at this time through the United Nations”); id. at 9543 (statement of Sen. Saltonstall) 
(“We are in Korea because under the United Nations Charter . . . we are attempting to keep 
peace.”); id. at 9544 (statement of Sen. Connally) (noting “serious obligations resting upon 
us as a nation, because of our plighted faith to support the United Nations”). 
104 96 Cong. Rec. 9541 (1950). 
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Scott Lucas viewed the Security Council Resolution as “a fact that can-
not be stressed too much.”105 
Although the constitutionality of Truman’s intervention in Korea re-
mains doubtful today, in practice the executive branch has since used 
similar reasoning in justifying other interventions, including the war in 
Vietnam. The State Department memorandum defending the legality of 
the President’s intervention there relied on three independent arguments 
in concluding that there was “no question” as to the constitutionality of 
his actions.106 One of these arguments relied on the Southeast Asia Col-
lective Defense Treaty (“SEATO”).107 Under this treaty, members 
agreed to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with [their] 
constitutional processes,” and the State Department rather dubiously 
read this language as implying that the President could undertake what-
ever actions he deemed necessary to fulfill this obligation for the United 
States.108 This reasoning closely resembles that used with regard to the 
Korean War, since in both cases the State Department considered a U.S. 
treaty obligation to increase the President’s independent war powers. 
As importantly, however, the State Department’s justification for the 
Vietnam War reveals how opportunistically prior precedents like the 
Korean War can be used. As discussed above, the defenses of President 
Truman’s intervention in Korea relied heavily on the U.N. Security 
Council Resolution not simply because the U.N. Charter was a treaty 
commitment of the United States, but also because the U.N. Charter was 
seen as a transformative treaty commitment that conveyed powerful ex-
tra-constitutional legitimacy and altered the meaning of war in interna-
tional law in ways that had constitutional ramifications. In Vietnam, 
however, there was no supportive Security Council Resolution. One 
might think that the State Department memorandum would have noted 
these comparative points of weakness, but its constitutional discussion 
 
105 Id. at 9542. 
106 See Dep’t of State Memorandum of Mar. 4, 1966, reprinted in 112 Cong. Rec. 5504–09 
(1966). 
107 See generally id. at 5508. In addition to relying on the SEATO Treaty, the memoran-
dum argued (1) that the President had the independent power to commit U.S. troops to Vi-
etnam as commander-in-chief (citing the Korean War, among others, as a precedent and also 
relying on the dubious numeric reasoning discussed supra note 94 and accompanying text) 
and (2) that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution constituted congressional authorization. See id.at 
5507–09. 
108 Id. at 5508 (acknowledging but essentially ignoring evidence from the ratification his-
tory that a land army would not be used by the President for this purpose). 
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made scant mention of them.109 Instead, the comparisons drawn by the 
State Department only emphasized the constitutional strengths of the 
Vietnam intervention compared to Korea: 
In the Korean conflict, where large-scale hostilities were conducted 
with an American troop participation of a quarter of a million men, no 
declaration of war was made by the Congress. The President acted on 
the basis of his constitutional responsibilities. While the Security 
Council, under a treaty of this country—the United Nations Charter—
recommended assistance to the Republic of Korea against the Com-
munist armed attack, the United States had no treaty commitment at 
that time obligating us to join in the defense of South Korea. In the 
case of South Vietnam we have the obligation of the SEATO Treaty 
and clear expressions of congressional support. If the President could 
act in Korea without a declaration of war, a fortiori he is empowered 
to do so now in Vietnam.110 
This discussion demonstrates just how easily past practices can be 
used to justify still more expansive practices down the road. The State 
Department memorandum ignores or downplays factors that were im-
portant to President Truman’s constitutional war powers at the time of 
the Korean intervention—the Security Council Resolution, the para-
mount interest in having the United Nations be a success, the support of 
most members of Congress—in favor of a narrative of unbounded, uni-
lateral presidential action. This fluid use of the Korean War precedent, 
like the use of minor nineteenth-century engagements, helped develop 
the current, extraordinarily broad understanding of the President’s war 
powers. 
C. Sole Executive Agreements 
The text of the Constitution provides only one clear way for the Unit-
ed States to make international agreements. This is the Treaty Clause, 
which gives the President the power to make treaties with the advice and 
consent of two-thirds of the Senate.111 Today, however, the President en-
ters into many international agreements under his own authority. Known 
 
109 Id. at 5507–09. The memorandum did discuss the absence of a Security Council Reso-
lution in the section addressing the intervention’s legality under international law. Id. at 
5505–06. 
110 Id. at 5509. 
111 U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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as sole executive agreements, these tend to be more modest international 
legal commitments than treaties approved through the Treaty Clause, but 
they still serve as a substantial source of presidential foreign affairs 
powers.112 
As with recognition powers and war powers, international law has 
bolstered the President’s power to make sole executive agreements.113 
Historically, constitutional actors used international law in all three of 
the ways described in Part I in determining and defending these in-
creased powers. More specifically, international law helped justify the 
President’s power to enter into the two types of sole executive agree-
ments that form the roots of this power: first, agreements settling claims 
between U.S. nationals and foreign nations; and second, temporary 
agreements, known as modi vivendi, with other nations pending more 
permanent arrangements. As with recognition (though in a less pro-
nounced way), the sole organ doctrine played a part in these develop-
ments, and so did several other principles of international law. 
1. Claims Settlement Agreements 
Claims settlement agreements are a well-established type of sole ex-
ecutive agreements and have done the most to establish the President’s 
power to enter into sole executive agreements. These agreements initial-
ly settled the claims of U.S. citizens against foreign nations, though they 
have now come to have broader scopes.114 The first involved the Wil-
mington Packet, a privately owned American ship that was seized by a 
Dutch privateer in a way that the United States believed violated a treaty 
between the Netherlands and the United States. In 1799, the U.S. diplo-
mat posted to the Netherlands entered into an agreement with his Dutch 
 
112 For discussions of the reach of sole executive agreements, see, e.g., Michael D. Ram-
sey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 133 (1998); Brad-
ford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1573 (2007). 
113 I focus here only on sole executive agreements, but international law has also strength-
ened the President’s hand in other forms of international agreements. For example, the sole 
organ doctrine helped persuade the Senate to abdicate a formal pre-negotiation role with re-
gard to treaties made through the Treaty Clause, see S. Foreign Relations Comm., 14th 
Cong., Rep. of Feb. 15, 1816 (1st Sess. 1816), though the best evidence suggests that the 
Framers intended the Senate to play both pre-negotiation and post-negotiation roles, see Jean 
Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 Yale J. Int’l L. 247, 256–58 (2012). 
114 Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International Claim Settlement by the 
President, 44 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1, 1 (2003). Historically, sovereign immunity principles made it 
difficult or impossible for private citizens to pursue these claims on their own. Id. at 21. 
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counterpart whereby the Dutch government paid a sum of money to the 
United States on behalf of the American owners of the cargo and in re-
turn was released of all claims.115 From the perspective of foreign rela-
tions law, the most interesting thing about the settlement process is the 
lack of evidence suggesting that the U.S. executive branch officials in-
volved ever considered whether they had the constitutional power to 
make the agreement.116 They seem to have simply assumed that they had 
this power—an assumption which presumably was influenced as a mat-
ter of extra-constitutional legitimacy by the fact that, as a matter of in-
ternational law, this was the kind of thing that foreign offices did for 
their citizens. 
As the State Department undertook more claims settlement agree-
ments, however, the constitutional justifications began to be formally 
developed. These justifications relied on international law as a principle 
of constitutional interpretation. Most prominently, constitutional actors 
cited the sole organ doctrine, which, as discussed earlier, is grounded in 
a mix of international law and perceptions of executive power. In 1835, 
Andrew Jackson vetoed an act that would have authorized the Secretary 
of State to settle claims of American citizens with Sicily and Naples for 
less than the full amount, on the ground that the “Executive [already] 
has competent authority to negotiate about it for them with a foreign 
government—an authority Congress can not constitutionally abridge or 
increase.”117  When the question of the President’s power to enter into 
claims settlement agreements ultimately reached the courts, they would 
similarly emphasize the sole organ doctrine and the appropriateness, as a 
matter of international law, that claims settlement be handled by the 
State Department.118 
 
115 See Letter from William Vans Murray to U.S. Secretary of State Timothy Pickering 
(Dec. 23, 1799), in 5 Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America 
1099 (Hunter Miller ed., 1937) [hereinafter Miller].  
116 There is no mention of the constitutional question, for example, in the lengthy compila-
tion of documents in Miller, supra note 115, at 1075–1103, related to the Wilmington Packet.  
117 Andrew Jackson, Veto Message to the Senate (Mar. 3, 1835), in 3 Richardson, supra 
note 74, at 146. 
118 E.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 683 (1981) (quoting language from 
Ozanic); Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1951) (“The continued mutual 
amity between the nation and other powers again and again depends upon a satisfactory 
compromise of mutual claims; the necessary power to make such compromises has existed 
from the earliest times and been exercised by the foreign offices of all civilized nations.”); 
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (relying on the “sole organ” doctrine); 
see also Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presi-
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In addition to the sole organ doctrine, constitutional actors also de-
rived the President’s power to enter into claims settlement agreements 
from the international legal responsibility of nations to look after the in-
terests of their citizens—a responsibility that, as discussed earlier, was 
understood to lie primarily with the executive. “In making [claims set-
tlement agreements],” explained a Department of State Memorandum in 
1922, “the Executive has taken appropriate steps to obtain redress for in-
fringement of rights of American citizens under treaties and under inter-
national law.”119 
These two international legal doctrines helped develop the President’s 
constitutional power to enter into claims settlement agreements. In addi-
tion, textualists have come to use international law as an input for under-
standing the meaning of the word “treaties” in the Treaty Clause in a 
way that also supports this presidential power. Professor Michael Ram-
sey, for example, has argued that the word “treaties” is meant to invoke 
a distinction made by Vattel and other eighteenth-century international 
legal theorists between different types of international agreements.120 
Vattel used “treaties” to refer to particularly important international 
agreements, whereas “agreements” referred to less significant undertak-
ings.121 International law thus provides a textualist basis for finding some 
international agreements made outside the Treaty Clause by the Presi-
dent to be constitutional, but also for requiring that more significant in-
ternational commitments go through the Treaty Clause.122 This use of in-
 
dential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: Part I, 54 Yale L.J. 
181, 249–50 (1945) (attributing claims settlement power to the sole organ doctrine); id. at 
268 (“International law and practice provide that claims by citizens of one government 
against another government may be prosecuted only through the foreign office of the claim-
ant’s government.”).  
119 Memorandum of the Solicitor for the Department of State (Nielsen), sent to Senator 
Lodge by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) (Aug. 23, 1922), quoted in 5 Green Hay-
wood Hackworth, Digest of International Law 390 (1943); see also James F. Barnett, Inter-
national Agreements Without the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 15 Yale L.J. 63, 76 
(1905) (explaining, in a section on claims settlement agreements, how “[o]ne of the principal 
duties of the department of state relates to the protection of American citizens abroad”). 
120 Ramsey, supra note 112, at 165–71. The Supreme Court drew a similar textualist dis-
tinction between “Treaties” for purposes of the Treaty Clause and “Agreements or Com-
pacts” for purposes of the State Compacts Clause as far back as Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 
540, 571–72 (1840), though this decision related to vertical separation of powers rather than 
to their horizontal separation.  
121 Ramsey, supra note 112, at 165–71 (discussing the issue with much more nuance). 
122 See id. at 204 (making this argument in the claims settlement context). To the contrary, 
however, scholars who think the meaning of “treaties” in the Constitution should be under-
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ternational law, however, may be historically less important than the us-
es of the sole organ doctrine and the responsibility for the protection of 
American citizens in the development of the President’s claim settle-
ment powers, however, as there is little evidence that the executive actu-
ally relied on it during the formative periods. 
2. Modi Vivendi 
A modus vivendi is “an arrangement of a temporary and provisional 
nature concluded between . . . subjects of international law which gives 
rise to binding obligations on the parties.”123 As with claim settlement 
agreements, it came to be accepted that Presidents could enter into modi 
vivendi under their sole constitutional powers. Some modi vivendi were 
procedural in nature, setting forth the ground rules that would govern a 
treaty negotiation. The President’s authority to enter into these was ac-
cepted as flowing from his sole organ power, but constitutional actors 
have also used this power to justify other more substantive modi vivendi, 
such as provisional agreements on boundary disputes or fishing rights 
pending their final resolutions.124 
One particularly bold use of a modus vivendi was made by Theodore 
Roosevelt with the Dominican Republic. He had negotiated a treaty with 
the Dominican Republic that would, among other things, place the Unit-
ed States in charge of collecting the Dominican Republic’s customs rev-
enue.125 When the Senate did not immediately have the votes needed for 
its advice and consent, President Roosevelt simply arranged a modus vi-
 
stood in light of current rather than eighteenth-century international law have argued that, in 
light of developments in international law, important international commitments can be 
“agreements” rather than “treaties” and that this is relevant for constitutional purposes. E.g., 
McDougal & Lans, supra note 118, at 195–97, 318–28. 
123 Walter Rudolf, Modus Vivendi, in 3 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 442–44 
(Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1997). 
124 Memorandum from Alvey A. Adee, Acting Secretary of State to W.A.F. Ekengren, 
Swedish Charge d’Affaires ad interim (Mar. 22, 1907), quoted in 5 Hackworth, supra note 
119, at 392 (“The executive department of the government is confided the general authority 
over foreign intercourse, and, as a necessary incident to such authority, the executive pos-
sesses a large and undefined power to enter into compacts and agreements relating to almost 
every topic properly subject to international negotiation. A typical illustration of an agree-
ment within the competence of the Executive . . . is the ordinary case of a modus vivendi.”); 
cf. Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. 288, 294 (1870) (deeming the power to make a mo-
dus vivendi over a boundary to be “a necessary incident to every national government” and 
further stating that it “inheres where the executive power is vested”).  
125 For a detailed discussion, see W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate 212–29 
(1933). 
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vendi that effectively implemented the customs-collections provisions of 
the treaty.126 This sharply reduced the relevance of the Senate’s review 
of the treaty and, as Roosevelt well knew, was a move of dubious consti-
tutionality.127 During the angry debate that followed in the Senate, Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s chief defender, Senator John Spooner of Wisconsin, 
had very little to offer in the way of constitutional justifications.128 One 
of his few arguments, however, drew upon international legal principles. 
He claimed that the modus vivendi was appropriate because the pending 
treaty created an “obligation of honor” upon both parties to act in a way 
that would respect the terms of the future treaty.129 Although Spooner 
did not elaborate on this “obligation of honor,” it invokes an internation-
al legal principle that nations owe some duties to each other regarding a 
treaty from the time a treaty is signed, not just after it is ratified.130 
Spooner then argued that this obligation meant that the “President not 
only had a constitutional right to [enter into the modus vivendi], but it 
was his duty . . . . to this body where the treaty is pending to do it.”131 
Spooner’s argument is yet another example of the use of international 
law as a background principle of constitutional interpretation, albeit a 
particularly unconvincing and opportunistic one. 
Although less significant than claims settlement agreements, modi vi-
vendi have proved important to constitutional justifications of the Presi-
dent’s power to enter into sole executive agreements more generally. 
Almost all defenses of this presidential power have relied heavily on the 
past practice of one or both of claims settlement agreements and modi 
vivendi.132 The role that international legal principles like the sole organ 
 
126 Id. at 222–23. 
127 Roosevelt later observed that “[t]he Constitution did not explicitly give me the power to 
bring about [the modus vivendi]. But the Constitution did not forbid my doing what I did. I 
put the agreement into effect, and I continued its execution for two years before the Senate 
acted . . . .” Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography 524 (1916). 
128 See 40. Cong. Rec. 1423–31 (1906). 
129 Id. at 1425–26. 
130 In the eighteenth century, this doctrine was so strong that nations were understood to be 
obligated to ratify treaties that they signed, see Galbraith, supra note 113, at 265–68. Today, 
vestiges of this doctrine remain in the principle that signatories to a treaty are obliged not to 
take acts that would defeat its “object and purpose” prior to its entry into force. Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
131 40. Cong. Rec. 1426 (1906). 
132 See, e.g., George Sutherland, Constitutional Power and World Affairs 120–21 (1919); 
Corwin, supra note 75, at 119–23; Wright, supra note 61, at 237–46. Where sole executive 
agreements relate to military affairs, however, they are often justified by reference to the 
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doctrine have played in helping build the President’s sole executive 
agreement powers therefore reaches beyond these two particular types of 
agreements. 
IV. PAST PRACTICE TODAY 
The prior Part described the debt that the President’s expansive for-
eign affairs powers owe to international law. It showed how constitu-
tional actors who favored presidential power relied on international legal 
principles in justifying accruals of presidential power vis-à-vis Con-
gress. The practices discussed in the prior Part, however, all took place 
in the past, mostly in the nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth centuries. 
In this Part, I turn to the practice of foreign relations law today, and to 
the roles played or not played by international law. I do so by looking at 
three assertive exercises of presidential foreign affairs powers by the 
Obama Administration in the last few years: its stance on the recognition 
power taken in Zivotofsky v. Clinton; its military intervention in Libya 
without Congressional authorization; and its apparent assertion that the 
President can ratify the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(“ACTA”) on behalf of the United States as a sole executive agreement. 
On the face of the Administration’s defense of these actions, interna-
tional law matters little, if at all, to the constitutional separation of for-
eign affairs powers today. Consistent with the separation-of-powers 
anomaly discussed in Part II, the legal justifications given for the Presi-
dent’s actions do not treat international law as a background principle of 
constitutional interpretation or indeed even rely on it as an input for oth-
er principles of constitutional interpretation. Yet this does not mean that 
international law has played no role in defining the current practices. For 
what these justifications do rely on—and rely on primarily—are either 
the past practices that were described in Part III or later practices that 
were in turn derivative of those practices. Since these past practices are 
now used without any consideration of their international legal roots, 
 
commander-in-chief clause. E.g., Corwin, supra note 75, at 117–18. Interestingly, the Su-
preme Court’s dicta in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. supporting international 
agreements made other than through the Treaty Clause does not specifically rely on the 
claims settlement agreements or modi vivendi, although it does rely on international law 
more generally. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“[T]he power to make such international agree-
ments as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense . . . [while not] expressly af-
firmed by the Constitution, nevertheless exist as inherently inseparable from the conception 
of nationality. . . . [based on] the law of nations.”). 
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however, the role that international law played in creating them is for-
gotten and the nuances that international law might bring to their inter-
pretation are lost. 
A. Zivotofsky 
During the 2011 term, the Supreme Court considered a showdown be-
tween Congress and the President over whether U.S. citizens born in Je-
rusalem could list “Israel” as their nation of birth on their U.S. pass-
ports.133 Congress had passed a statute requiring that the State 
Department allow U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem to do so,134 but the 
Obama Administration refused to enforce this statute. Noting a con-
sistent executive policy since the Eisenhower Administration of not rec-
ognizing Jerusalem as part of any state, the executive branch claimed 
that this statute violated an exclusive presidential power to recognize 
foreign states.135 
In Zivotofsky v. Clinton, an American citizen born in Jerusalem chal-
lenged the executive branch’s refusal to enforce the Congressional stat-
ute. The district court and the D.C. Circuit dismissed the case as barred 
by the political question doctrine, but the Supreme Court reversed, with 
eight justices agreeing that the case was justiciable. Although the merits 
were fully briefed and argued, the Court chose not to address them, but 
rather remanded for the D.C. Circuit to address the merits in the first in-
stance.136 The D.C. Circuit had not decided this case at the time this 
piece was finalized for publication, but the original D.C. Circuit opinion 
suggests that the court will agree with the Obama Administration that 
the President has an exclusive recognition power upon which the statute 
impermissibly intrudes.137 
 
133 Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424 (2012). 
134 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat. 
1350, 1366 (2002). In a signing statement, President George W. Bush had stated that this 
statutory provision (and other associated ones) unconstitutionally interfered with his recogni-
tion powers. See Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1425.  
135 Brief for the Respondent at 13, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (No. 10-
699).  
136 Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1430–31. 
137 Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (asserting that is 
has been “clear from the earliest days of the Republic” that the recognition power “belongs 
solely to the President”); see also id. at 1245 (Edwards, J., concurring) (concluding that the 
statute “impermissibly intrudes on the President’s exclusive power to recognize foreign sov-
ereigns”).  
GALBRAITH_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2013 2:44 PM 
2013] International Law and Separation of Powers 1035 
Throughout the briefing and oral argument, past practice formed the 
backbone of the executive branch’s assertion of an exclusive recognition 
power. The brief for the Secretary of State emphasized that 
“[l]ongstanding Executive Branch practice, congressional acquiescence, 
and judicial precedent establish that the President[] . . . [has] the exclu-
sive power to recognize foreign states and their governments.”138 It de-
voted seven pages to the past practices of recognition, including Presi-
dent Washington’s decision to recognize the revolutionary government 
of France and the back-and-forth between Congress and the President 
over the recognition of Cuba.139 At oral argument, the Solicitor General 
also spent substantial time on historical practice and argued that it was 
“critical as a matter of history . . . that there is not a single piece of legis-
lation that has passed both houses of Congress and come to the President 
purporting to recognize a foreign nation.”140 
Although the executive branch lawyers emphasized past practice, they 
did not mention international law’s role in shaping past practice or oth-
erwise treat international law as relevant to the constitutional question. 
The brief for the Secretary of State treated the past practices as growing 
out of domestic considerations. When it relied on the Washington Ad-
ministration’s decision to recognize the revolutionary government of 
France, it did not mention the role that international law played in this 
constitutional precedent; and although its discussion of the dispute over 
the recognition of Cuba referenced Senator Hale’s memorandum, it did 
not note the international-law-based reasoning underpinning this memo-
randum.141 The treatment of the sole organ doctrine is particularly strik-
ing. It is mentioned, to be sure, but its international legal underpinnings 
are not. Instead, the brief treats the sole organ doctrine as reflecting a 
 
138 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 135, at 14. As a textual matter, the brief also em-
phasized the Receive Ambassadors Clause, see, e.g., id., but at oral argument, the Solicitor 
General acknowledged that this clause was not essential to his argument. See Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 42, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (No. 10-699). 
139 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 135 at 18–24.  
140 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 25; see also id. at 25, 28–30 (discuss-
ing past practice).  
141 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 135, at 18–24. The reply brief for Zivotofsky, 
however, does claim that international law shaped the Washington Administration’s deci-
sion. Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 5–7, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (No. 10-
699) (citing Professor Reinstein’s work). Justice Kennedy asked Zivotofsky’s counsel one 
question in relation to this argument, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 55–56, 
but the discussion of the recognition power in the Court’s eventual opinion made no refer-
ence to international law. See generally Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. 1421.  
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principle of domestic expediency—one aimed at “avoiding conflicting 
foreign-policy pronouncements among the three Branches.”142 By ignor-
ing how international law has helped shape past practice, constitutional 
actors in the executive branch thus presented a different—and much 
stronger case—for the President’s recognition power than the historical 
record reflects. 
B. Libya 
President Obama’s decision to use force in Libya demonstrates just 
how much the executive’s independent war powers have developed 
since the Founding. On March 19, 2011, following a U.N. Security 
Council Resolution authorizing the use of force, President Obama and 
European allies initiated “a military intervention on a scale not seen in 
the Arab world since the Iraq war.”143 “Operation Odyssey Dawn” en-
forced a no-fly-zone over Libya and carried out extensive bombing of 
strategic targets in order to “prevent[] Qaddafi from overrunning those 
who oppose him.”144 In advising the President that he could constitution-
ally undertake this intervention without congressional authorization, the 
Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) relied mainly on past practice, ex-
plaining that “[e]arlier opinions of this Office and other historical prece-
dents establish the framework for our analysis.”145 
In its memorandum, OLC’s use of international law was notably lim-
ited. Unlike the State Department’s memorandum on the President’s use 
of force in Korea, the OLC memorandum did not directly rely on inter-
national law in its constitutional interpretation. Instead, for OLC, the on-
ly legal relevance of the Security Council’s resolution was that it trig-
gered an “important” U.S. interest—namely, “preserving the credibility 
and effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council.”146 Gone was 
the argument that the President had the independent authority under the 
Take Care Clause to implement a Security Council Resolution, and gone 
was the claim that the Security Council Resolution changed the nature of 
 
142 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 135, at 27. 
143 David D. Kirkpatrick et al., Allies Open Air Assault on Qaddafi’s Forces, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 20, 2011, at A1. 
144 Libya Memorandum, supra note 1, at 5. 
145 Id. at 6. 
146 Id. As noted supra note 26 and accompanying text, the Security Council Resolution 
may have also been tacitly used as a source of extra-constitutional legitimacy. 
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the action from “war” to “police action.”147 Instead, OLC simply relied 
on past practice, mostly of recent vintage, including a 1980 OLC Memo-
randum on Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad without 
Statutory Authorization and the OLC memoranda supporting the 1992 
intervention in Somalia, the 1995 deployment to Bosnia, and the 2004 
intervention in Haiti.148 
These prior OLC memoranda in turn relied heavily on past practices 
in which international law played a role, but ignored or watered down 
how international law helped justify these practices. In terms of minor 
engagements, the memoranda simply emphasized the large number of 
times the President has used force abroad with little discussion of the 
contemporaneous justifications given for these uses.149 Durand v. Hol-
lins and the bombardment of Greytown became straightforward prece-
dents for the President’s power to respond to attacks against American 
citizens without any consideration of either the international legal roots 
 
147 See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. Intriguingly, several foreign relations 
law scholars felt it necessary to articulate why, in their view, the Security Council Resolution 
did not change the legal analysis presented—even though the Obama Administration was not 
formally arguing otherwise. See Michael J. Glennon, Forum: The Cost of “Empty Words”: A 
Comment on the Justice Department’s Libya Opinion, Harv. Nat’l Security J. 7–14, (2011), 
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Forum_Glennon.pdf; Statement by Louis 
Fisher before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Libya and War Powers 1, 3 (June 
28, 2011), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fisher_Testimony.pdf. These re-
sponses may reflect frustration with the role the Security Council Resolution was playing as 
an extra-constitutional source of legitimacy. 
148 Libya Memorandum, supra note 1, at 6–9 (drawing primarily on these memoranda and 
the interventions they authorized). The President’s initial decision to use force in Libya 
without congressional authorization was basically consistent with these practices. His deci-
sion to continue using force in Libya, however, was a more dramatic break from precedent, 
as this decision was difficult to reconcile with the requirements of the War Powers Resolu-
tion. See Trevor W. Morrison, Forum: Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and 
the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 62, 62–63, 66 
(2011). 
149 Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, to the Counsel for the President, Proposed Deployment of United States Armed 
Forces into Bosnia 4 n.4 and accompanying text (Nov. 30, 1995), available at 
www.justice.gov/olc/bosnia2.htm [hereinafter Bosnia Memorandum]; Memorandum from 
Timothy E. Flanigan, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to William P. 
Barr, Attorney General, Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia 3 n.2 and 
accompanying text (Dec. 4, 1992), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/presiden.8.htm 
[hereinafter Somalia Memorandum]; Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant 
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to the Counsel for the President, Deployment of 
United States Armed Forces to Haiti 2 (Mar. 17, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/
olc/2004/legalityofdeployment.pdf [hereinafter Haiti Memorandum]. 
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of this power or the relevance of Greytown’s piratical character.150 Even 
more interesting was the way the memoranda relied on treaty-based 
precedents and yet downplayed the importance of the treaty obligations 
in describing these precedents. All four memoranda explicitly used the 
Korean War as a precedent but described it in ways that minimized the 
role that international law played in its constitutional justification.151 
(This occurred even though the interventions at issue in the Haiti and 
Somalia memoranda were, like the Korean War, authorized by the U.N. 
Security Council, and one might therefore think the international legal 
reasoning used in the Korean War would have been applicable.) None of 
the four memoranda suggested that the Security Council’s role might af-
fect whether the intervention constitutes a “war.” Only the oldest of 
these memoranda—the 1980 one—reiterated the claim that the President 
has authority under the Take Care Clause to use force to advance U.S. 
international legal commitments and the memorandum was hesitant to 
treat the Korean War as an example of this authority.152 The later three 
memoranda simply dropped the Take Care Clause justification altogeth-
er.153 These three memoranda did rely on the one remaining use of inter-
national law for constitutional purposes made during the Korean War: 
 
150 See Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authoriza-
tion, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 187 (1980) [hereinafter Presidential Power Memorandum]; Soma-
lia Memorandum, supra note 149, at 3; Haiti Memorandum, supra note 149, at 2–3. 
151 Two memoranda used the Korean and Vietnam Wars as precedential support for unilat-
eral presidential power to initiate hostilities. Presidential Power Memorandum, supra note 
150, at 187–89 (treating the Korean and Vietnam Wars as appropriate precedents for presi-
dential initiation of hostilities, although noting the need of congressional approval for sus-
taining the operations); Bosnia Memorandum, supra note 149, at 3 (citing approvingly to the 
Vietnam and Korean Memoranda as support for unilateral presidential action without refer-
ence to their treaty-based arguments, although noting in a footnote that it was “unnecessary” 
to consider whether presidential power reached as far as to cover the Korean War); id. at 4 
n.5. The other two used it only in claiming that supporting the United Nations is an interest 
of the United States as described infra note 154. 
152 Presidential Power Memorandum, supra note 150, at 186 (observing that “[t]he Presi-
dent also derives authority from his duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ 
for both treaties and customary international law are part of our law and Presidents have re-
peatedly asserted authority to enforce our international obligations even when Congress has 
not enacted implementing legislation,” but qualifying this claim in a footnote); id. at 188 n.7 
(stating, in relation to Korea, that “[a]lthough support for this introduction of our armed 
forces into a ‘hot’ war could be found in the U.N. Charter and a Security Council resolution, 
the fact remains that this commitment of substantial forces occurred without congressional 
approval”). 
153 This abandonment of the Take Care Clause argument by the executive branch thus pre-
dates the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellin v. Texas discussed supra note 29. 
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the claim that support for the United Nations constitutes a key U.S. in-
terest. Even here, however, the argument was watered down: Where this 
was a “paramount” U.S. interest in the Korea Memorandum, it slipped to 
being a “vital” U.S. interest in the Somalia and Bosnia, and Haiti inter-
ventions154—and, as noted above, dwindled still further in the Libya 
Memorandum to being simply an “important” U.S. interest.155 
Constitutional decision-making on the use of force has thus become 
almost entirely divorced doctrinally from international law, even though 
international law helped justify past practices on which the current doc-
trine relies. This divorce has important implications for the President’s 
power to initiate military interventions without congressional support. 
On the one hand, international law no longer provides a direct boost to 
presidential power as a matter of doctrine (though it may still serve as a 
source of extra-constitutional legitimacy). This is not very significant, 
however, because international law is no longer directly needed for these 
boosts—instead, constitutional actors can support sole presidential uses 
of force simply by pointing to past practices without further considering 
the international legal roots of these practices. On the other hand—and 
more significantly—the divorce between constitutional decision-making 
and international law means that international law no longer supplies 
any recognized limits on the President’s power to initiate military inter-
ventions. International law has ceased to be used as a boundary between 
constitutionally acceptable and constitutionally dubious independent 
presidential uses of force; instead, recent OLC memoranda treat the 
President as having the constitutional authority to initiate the use of 
force in violation of international law.156 
C. The ACTA 
As with the Libya intervention, the constitutional question of whether 
the United States can ratify the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement as 
 
154 Somalia Memorandum, supra note 149, at 4 (quoting “paramount” language from the 
Korea Memorandum as well); Bosnia Memorandum, supra note 153, at 5; Haiti Memoran-
dum, supra note 153, at 4 (quoting “paramount” language from the Korea Memorandum as 
well). 
155 Libya Memorandum, supra note 1, at 6, 10, 12; see also id. at 12 (quoting the Bosnia 
Memorandum for the word “vital,” though not directly applying it to the Libya intervention). 
156 See Somalia Memorandum, supra note 149, at 1 (noting in cover memo that a Security 
Council Resolution is not a “precondition” for presidential action); Haiti Memorandum, su-
pra note 149, at 4 (same).  
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a sole executive agreement has so far remained outside the courts. The 
ACTA is an international agreement negotiated among an important 
group of developed countries that mandates strong enforcement efforts 
and tough penalties for intellectual property violations.157 U.S. law al-
ready satisfies most or all of the ACTA’s requirements,158 but, if the 
United States were to ratify the ACTA, it would be committed to these 
requirements as a matter of international law, rather than simply domes-
tic law. Because the ACTA is controversial—its ratification is opposed 
by some influential organizations who deem it too harsh an enforcement 
regime159—it would be very difficult for the President to obtain the ad-
vice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate in support of it (or alterna-
tively to get Congress to approve it as a congressional-executive agree-
ment). As a result, the constitutional question is critically important to 
whether the United States will ratify the ACTA. If the President has the 
power to ratify this agreement as a sole executive agreement, then he 
can do so whenever he chooses; but if he needs Congress or the Senate, 
then ratification will be impossible or, at best, a difficult fight that re-
quires the expenditure of significant political capital. 
Unlike with Zivotofsky and the Libya intervention, the executive 
branch has not produced any extensive, publicly available explanation of 
why it considers that the President can constitutionally ratify the ACTA 
as a sole executive agreement. To date, we only have brief assertions by 
executive-branch officials—mostly contained in letters responding to the 
inquiries of a member of Congress160—plus some academic scholarship 
 
157 See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010, 50 I.L.M. 243, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2417. 
158  Oona A. Hathaway & Amy Kapczynski, Going It Alone: The Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement as a Sole Executive Agreement, ASIL INSIGHTS (Aug. 24, 2011), 
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110824.pdf (noting dispute over whether the ACTA 
is fully compatible with existing U.S. domestic law). 
159 Id. at 3 (noting concerns raised by a coalition that includes Google, Facebook, Mi-
crosoft, and eBay). Advocacy groups favoring Internet freedom such as EFF are also oppo-
nents. See, e.g., Maira Sutton & Parker Higgins, We Have Every Right to be Furious about 
ACTA, Electronic Frontier Foundation, (Jan. 27, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2012/01/we-have-every-right-be-furious-about-acta. Resistance to ACTA has already led the 
European Parliament to reject it. See Charles Arthur, ACTA down, but not out, as Europe 
vote against controversial treaty, The Guardian at 1 (July 4, 2012, 9:24 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jul/04/acta-european-parliament-votes-against. 
160 See sources cited supra note 3. Some commentators have read the Obama Administra-
tion as claiming it can ratify the ACTA as an ex ante congressional-executive agreement, 
since a letter by State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh notes that the “ACTA was ne-
gotiated in response to express congressional calls for international cooperation to enhance 
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exploring the constitutional question in more depth.161 As support for its 
argument that the ACTA can be ratified as a sole executive agreement, 
the executive branch has relied primarily on past practice. The oldest 
practice it cites is the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT),162 and it also cites a “long line” of later, more minor trade 
agreements which were ratified as sole executive agreements.163 
The executive branch’s limited public defense of its position makes 
analysis of its legal reasoning and of the historical pedigree it relies upon 
more difficult than with Zivotofsky and the Libya intervention. Nonethe-
less, it seems that international law is not playing any direct role in the 
constitutional question of whether the President can ratify the ACTA as 
a sole executive agreement. The executive branch pronouncements on 
this question, such as they are, do not suggest that international law is 
playing any direct part; and nor does the scholarship produced to date on 
the issue.164 Like the other examples, however, this does not mean that 
international law has not influenced the constitutional analysis, but ra-
ther any such influence must lie in how international law helped develop 
the past practices that built the President’s sole executive agreement 
power. As discussed earlier, international legal concepts indeed help de-
velop these practices, including ones in the claims settlement and modus 
 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.” Letter from Harold Koh, supra note 3, at 1; Jack 
Goldsmith, The Doubtful Constitutionality of ACTA as an Ex Ante Congressional-Executive 
Agreement, Lawfare Blog (May 21, 2012, 1:03 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/05/
the-doubtful-constitutionality-of-acta-as-an-ex-ante-congressional-executive-agreement/. I 
view this argument as a secondary one, however, since (1) Koh’s letter does not disavow the 
sole executive agreement justification, see generally Letter from Harold Koh, supra note 3; 
and (2) as a matter of statutory construction, it is difficult to read the statute cited in Koh’s 
letter as congressional authorization of ACTA’s ratification. See Goldsmith, supra. An even 
more recent speech by Koh suggests that he would view an executive branch ratification of 
ACTA as falling on a spectrum between ex ante congressional-executive agreement and a 
sole executive agreement. Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Thomas F. Ryan 
Lecture at Georgetown University Law School, Twenty-First Century International Law-
making (Oct. 17, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/199319.htm.  
161 See Sean Flynn, ACTA’s Constitutional Problem: The Treaty Is Not a Treaty, 26 Am. 
U. Int’l L. Rev. 903, 904 (2011); Hathaway & Kapczynski, supra note 158. 
162 USTR Fact Sheet, supra note 3. 
163 Letter from Ron Kirk, supra note 3, at 1; Letter from Harold Koh, supra note 3, at 2. 
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of these sole executive agreements 
but has held that they should not affect its interpretation of previously enacted congressional 
statutes. See Quality King Distribs. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 153–54 (1998) 
(finding three of the executive agreements later cited in the Kirk Letter to be “irrelevant” to a 
statutory interpretation question before it). 
164 See generally sources cited supra notes 3 and 160. 
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vivendi context that helped cement the President’s sole executive agree-
ment power.165 
V. RETHINKING PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
So far, this Article has been mostly descriptive. I have shown that 
while today international law is rarely if at all used as a direct principle 
of constitutional interpretation in resolving separation of powers dis-
putes, historically constitutional actors drew on it in resolving these dis-
putes in favor of the President. This Part considers implications that this 
account holds for our present understanding of presidential power. I first 
argue that this account offers grounds for skepticism, or at least for care-
ful scrutiny, regarding arguments based on past practice. I then briefly 
turn to consider the role that international law could play in separation of 
powers interpretation today. 
A. Skepticism About Past Practice 
There are several reasons why past practice is important to constitu-
tional interpretation. It can serve as an input for originalist thinking (as 
when it signals the views of constitutional actors who themselves had 
been Framers), but it can also stand alone as a principle of constitutional 
interpretation. Professors Bradley and Morrison suggest that it can have 
the Burkean quality of “reflect[ing] collective wisdom generated by the 
judgments of numerous actors over time.”166 It also can serve the same 
 
165 Additionally, in the specific context of the GATT, early executive branch justifications 
relied on the President’s sole organ powers. Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act: 
Hearing on H.R. 1211 Before the S. Comm. On Finance, 81st Cong. 1051 (1947) (statement 
of Winthrop G. Brown, Director, Office of Int’l Trade Policy, Dep’t of State) (“Under the 
Constitution the President, as the organ of the United States Government for the conduct of 
foreign affairs, has broad authority to discuss any matter of foreign relations with other gov-
ernments and come to tentative agreement with them as to how such matters should be han-
dled.”) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)). The rele-
vance of the GATT as a precedent for sole executive trade agreements is far more 
complicated that USTR’s reference to it in its Fact Sheet on ACTA suggests. President Tru-
man embraced a “provisional” agreement applying the GATT pending the GATT’s formal 
ratification in a way similar to Theodore Roosevelt’s modus vivendi with the Dominican Re-
public (though the provisional agreement lasted far longer, as the GATT itself was never rat-
ified). See Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive 
Agreements, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 671, 751–52 (1998). The executive branch defended this pro-
visional agreement as a mixture of a sole executive agreement and an ex ante congressional-
executive agreement. See id  
166 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 23, at 426. 
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values of consistency, predictability, efficiency, and protection of reli-
ance interests that respect for precedent serves in the context of judicial 
decision-making.167 But, as with judicial precedents, the power of past 
practice to actually advance these values is not absolute. Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. warned against overreliance on past practice when he com-
plained about following a rule simply because it was “laid down in the 
time of Henry IV”—and noted that it was “still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the 
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”168 Prior practices 
may not fit a present situation, even if these prior practices were wise 
ones for their times. Moreover, these prior practices may reflect poor 
initial decision-making or be narrower than their subsequent invocations 
suggest. 
This Article’s exploration of past foreign relations practice offers at 
least two reasons in favor of subjecting arguments rooted in past practice 
to more rigorous scrutiny than they presently receive. First, in line with 
Justice Holmes’s observation, I have shown that past practices establish-
ing the constitutional separation of powers rest in part on the use of in-
ternational law as a principle of constitutional interpretation—a use 
which is not comparably found today. Its absence today stems from a 
matter of principle on the part of constitutional actors who do not favor 
the use of international law as a principle of constitutional interpretation 
and from a matter of practice from constitutional actors who do favor 
such a role but use it primarily in the individual rights context. 
Both groups have reason to be wary of past practices that rest in part 
on the use of international law as principle of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Those constitutional actors and scholars who do not favor the use 
of international law in constitutional interpretation might not wish to re-
ly on past practices which are grounded on such uses. And those consti-
tutional actors who do favor the use of international law in constitutional 
interpretation should be concerned about relying on past practices where 
these practices rest in part on international legal principles that have 
since faded or vanished entirely. The structure of international law has 
changed substantially since the nineteenth century, both in terms of what 
it covers and how it is understood to operate. The sole organ doctrine 
that spurred the President’s recognition power, for example, is no longer 
 
167 Id. at 427–28. 
168 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897). 
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as important to international law as it was in the nineteenth century.169 
To give another example, international law regarding the use of force 
has changed dramatically since it was used in establishing past practices 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and it now sets rigorous 
doctrinal limits on when the use of force is permissible. Such develop-
ments raise serious questions about whether the premises undergirding 
past practices still remain valid. 
Second, the uses of past practice explored in this Article suggest that 
the strength and applicability of past practices are often overstated by 
supporters of increased presidential power. By ignoring international 
law, these supporters miss alternative explanations for why past practic-
es occurred and thus miss the nuances and limitations that these past 
practices contain. 
The debate over the recognition power illustrates this point. In the So-
licitor General’s retelling in Zivotofsky, the Washington Administra-
tion’s decision to recognize France becomes a decision “that this is an 
exclusive power” of the President,170 rather than a decision in which the 
constitutional issue was barely considered, if at all (let alone considered 
in terms of whether the power was concurrent or exclusive), and the  g 
was instead driven by the aim of complying with the law of nations. The 
Solicitor General’s emphasis on the absence of congressional statutes 
proclaiming recognition similarly overlooks a likely explanation related 
to international law in favor of a claim of broad Presidential power un-
der the Constitution. Rather than signaling congressional acceptance of 
an exclusive presidential recognition power, this absence instead might 
instead show respect for the international legal principle that states con-
duct their official business through a single representative authority.171 
 
169 See, e.g., Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, 
¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) (omitting any discussion of need for states to 
maintain a single representative authority); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 
(2004) (describing increasing disaggregation of states at the international level); Peter J. Spi-
ro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 649, 667–71 (2002) 
(discussing how the norms governing communication have changed). 
170 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 28 (emphasis added); see also id. at 25; 
Brief for Respondent, supra note 135, at 18 (characterizing the Washington Administration’s 
decision as an “assert[ion of] the sole authority to recognize which government represents a 
foreign state”) (emphasis added).  
171 See Penfield, supra note 69, at 408. Congress might accordingly consider itself entitled 
to participate in the internal decision-making process about recognition (as shown by nine-
teenth-century legislation closely tied to recognition), while leaving it to the President to un-
dertake the official act of recognition out of respect for international law. This in turn might 
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By overlooking the role that international law played in shaping past 
constitutional practice, the Solicitor General air-brushed out these nu-
ances and enabled a broader claim of presidential power. In turn, the 
original D.C. Circuit opinion accepted the executive branch’s characteri-
zations of past practice at face value without looking closely to see 
whether these are in fact warranted. It simply repeated the executive 
branch’s claim that past practice established the President’s exclusive 
recognition power not long after the Framing,172 stating in its opinion 
that it has been “clear from the earliest days of the Republic” that the 
recognition power “belongs solely to the President.”173 Had the court 
looked closely at the actual past practice, however, it would have dis-
covered that nineteenth-century precedents did not resolve whether the 
President’s recognition power was exclusive or concurrent with Con-
gress (and indeed arguably favored the latter position). 
Although these two points favor increased scrutiny of separation-of-
powers arguments based on past practice, they do not necessarily negate 
these arguments. The reasons on which past practices are based may re-
main entirely or mostly applicable today: The importance of efficiency 
and respect for reliance interests may be sufficient to justify the continu-
ance of the practice, or there may be other reasons why its continuance 
is desirable. Indeed, I myself believe that past practice is a valuable and 
appropriate tool of constitutional interpretation. My claim is simply that 
arguments based on past practice should be treated more warily than is 
presently the case. It is important to look beneath the surface and see if 
past practice really supports what it is said to support and, if so, whether 
the reasons underlying this practice remain true today. The need for 
scrutiny is especially strong because the executive branch may have in-
centives to inflate the significance of past practices supporting presiden-
tial exercises of power. The other branches should therefore be cautious 
in accepting such claims. Greater scrutiny of the sources and scope of 
past practices relied on the executive branch might lead courts to sub-
stantially different outcomes in separation-of-powers cases. 
 
suggest that Congress can constitutionally legislate on matters that have a close nexus with 
recognition, such as birthplace designations on U.S. passports, but that do not constitute offi-
cial communications between nations.  
172 See Brief for Appellee at 23, Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (No. 07-5347)  (claiming that “[f]or at least 150 years, it has been settled law that 
recognition of foreign sovereigns is a constitutional power vested exclusively in the Presi-
dent”). 
173 Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1231. 
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B. Using International Law Going Forward 
The influence that international law has had on the separation of for-
eign affairs powers in the past has implications for how international law 
could be used in separation of powers jurisprudence today. These impli-
cations are far from absolute, as approaches to constitutional interpreta-
tion rest as much on normative presumptions as on the lessons of experi-
ence. Nonetheless, for those who can normatively accept the prospect of 
international law’s use as a direct principle of constitutional interpreta-
tion, the past uses described in this Article offer both support and guid-
ance for how it could potentially be used today with regard to the sepa-
ration of powers. 
The past practice described here offers support for the use of interna-
tional law in the separation of powers because it shows that international 
law is not a “new source” of constitutional interpretation in this con-
text,174 but rather an old one. Accordingly, as Sarah Cleveland has ob-
served, “historical practice answers the legitimacy objection that interna-
tional law is ‘foreign’ to the American constitutional tradition.”175 
Indeed, the role that international law has played in helping to bolster 
executive power in the past might make it particularly fitting for interna-
tional law to be considered in assessing the limits of the Presidential 
power going forward. As this Article has shown, Presidents accrued 
power in the past in part by using international legal arguments, which 
in turn have helped deter Congress and the courts from resisting these 
exercises of power. Later Presidents then expanded on these practices by 
relying on them without recognizing their international legal roots. In 
essence, the President’s current powers make use of all the gains gotten 
from international law without also being responsive to the limits set by 
international law. Returning international law to the interpretive set 
would thus assist in recovering the boundary that international law used 
to help set between permissible and impermissible sole presidential ac-
tion.176 
 
174 Contra Alford, supra note 19, at 57–58.  
175 Cleveland, supra note 7, at 7. One can question how much international law today real-
ly follows continuously from international law in the nineteenth century, particularly given 
developments like human rights law. The examples used in this paper, however, are all ones 
that international law regulated in some manner back in the nineteenth century, though its 
specific contours have since changed.  
176 Cf. Wuerth, supra note 10, at 75–82 (arguing that, historically, the permissible bounda-
ries of the President’s commander-in-chief power were shaped by international law). 
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The past practices discussed in this Article also suggest that interna-
tional law might have functional value as a principle of constitutional 
interpretation in the separation of powers context. As one example, the 
nineteenth century reliance on international law principles in interpreting 
the boundary between when the President could use force on his own 
versus when he needed congressional authorization had practical ad-
vantages: it allowed the President to act swiftly in response to piratical 
communities, but encouraged congressional authorization where the 
force was aimed at other countries and was therefore more likely to cre-
ate international frictions. As this suggests, international law can serve 
as a useful proxy for assessing what actions might most risk internation-
al tensions. In the modern era, U.S. military operations abroad that are in 
compliance with international law, such as the Libya intervention au-
thorized by the Security Council, are less likely to cause international 
strife than operations in violation of international law. There might 
therefore be benefits to a constitutional approach that permitted the Pres-
ident alone to undertake military interventions of up to a certain scale 
that are in compliance with international law but that required congres-
sional authorization for military interventions that are in violation of in-
ternational law. The fit is not perfect—some actions in violation of in-
ternational law will doubtless cause little international tension, and some 
actions in furtherance of it will cause much tension—but it offers an im-
provement over the current doctrinal divorce between the scope of pres-
idential power and the international consequences of its exercise.177 
Past practice alone does not necessarily justify the use of international 
law in understanding the domestic separation of power. Nor does it an-
swer every question about how exactly international law might be used, 
what kinds of international law might be used, or what might incentivize 
constitutional actors to reincorporate international law into their consti-
tutional analysis. All these important questions lie well beyond the scope 
of this piece to address. But past practice does provide some clues for 
how international law might be used and, for those who view historical 
 
177 The functional value of this appeal is suggested by the fact that the Supreme Court has 
interpreted certain congressional statutes to incorporate international law in ways that con-
strain the President to act in accordance with international law. This is particularly true re-
garding the interpretation of statutes relevant to the detention and trial by military commis-
sion of alleged Al Qaeda combatants. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593–94 
(2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
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practice as enhancing legitimacy, some basis for thinking it might be ap-
propriate to use it. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1859, Czar Alexander II came across a soldier standing guard in an 
obscure part of his palace garden. Intrigued, he sought to learn why the 
soldier was posted there. The answer, which took some trouble to find, 
was that long ago Catherine the Great had seen a snowdrop in bloom on 
that spot, and ordered that it not be plucked. “This command had been 
carried out by placing a sentry on the spot, and ever since then”—
decades after the passing of the snowdrop—“one had stood there all the 
year round.”178 
Like the sentries of the Czar, the historical gloss remains long after 
the original reasons for exercises of presidential power have withered 
away. Today, the President is understood to have expansive foreign af-
fairs powers mostly because he has exercised them in the past. What is 
largely forgotten is why he initially exercised these powers, even though 
the answers might tell us something about the extent to which he should 
be doing so today. 
This Article has sought to uncover the forgotten role that international 
law played in furthering the rise of the President’s foreign affairs pow-
ers. It has shown that the President’s expansive foreign affairs powers 
developed in part through reasoning based on international law, even 
though today they are understood to rest on domestic grounds. In the 
process, it has shown that the doctrinal line between domestic and inter-
national law was once much more fluid than it is today. Ironically, even 
as international law has come to play a greater and greater role in world 
affairs, the boundary between international law and U.S. constitutional 
law has become steeper and higher. 
But the recovery of memory is only a first step. The revelation that 
the sentry had been posted to protect long-vanished snowdrops led the 
Czar to reassign him—or so one hopes. Similarly, once we begin to un-
derstand how the President’s powers vis-à-vis Congress were shaped by 
international law, then we can begin to rethink the roles that internation-
al law should play in expanding or constraining presidential power. 
 
178 1 Otto von Bismarck, Bismarck, the Man and Statesman 247 (New York and London, 
A.J. Butler trans., Harper & Bros. 1899). 
